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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to call for a new analysis of cyber security which departs from the 
traditional security theory. I argue that the cyber domain is inherently different in nature, in that 
it is lacking in traditional boundaries and is reflexive in nature. Policy-makers are aware of these 
characteristics, and in turn this awareness changes the way that national cyber security strategy is 
handled and understood. These changes cannot be adequately understood through traditional 
understanding of security, as they often are, without missing significant details. Rather, 
examining these changes through the lens of Ulrich Beck’s risk society theory allows us to fully 
understand these changes. To support my argument, I analyze statements made by Estonian 
policy-makers and stakeholder, demonstrating that the way that they understand the nature of the 
cyber domain and the drafting and handling of cyber security as a result of this understanding is 
best rationalized through a risk society framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The topic of this thesis will be the understanding and perception of risk and security by policy-
makers in cyber security and how it translates to strategy and policy. It will focus on how the 
notion of security is different in the cyber domain, shifting from a more threat-centric view to a 
risk-centric view. It argues so through the conceptual lens of Risk Society, the sociological 
theory put forward by Ulrich Beck in the 1990’s. The thesis will analyze cyber security through 
the specific case of Estonia, with particular focus on Estonian discourse of policy-makers and 
stakeholders. 
 
In today’s day and age, ‘cyber security’ is become and increasingly important and vogue topic. 
The topic of cyber security departs for many traditional discussions on security, along with the 
politics and policies that follow this discussion. My research aims to address exactly what 
changes have occurred in discourse at the policy-making level, with Estonia as a case study. 
Specifically I wish to address how Estonian policy makers understand and conceptualize cyber 
risk and how this influences their decisions. The concepts of risk and security have become 
increasingly intertwined and prevalent in the past two decades as risk comes forward as a main 
theme. There are many conceptualizations of the emerging risk-security nexus, but amongst the 
most influential is Ulrich Beck’s concept of risk society. This change calls for an new analysis of 
the understanding of risk by policy-makers. My analysis of the conceptualization of cyber risk by 
policy makers will be through the lens of risk society. 
 
This research hopes to fill a gap in the field of international relations in relation to the concept of 
risk society connected to cyber security. The understanding and treatment of security in the cyber 
domain is significantly different to that in traditional domains. This difference has not been 
adequately explored, and cannot be through analyzing the cyber domain and cyber security 
strategy through our normal conventional understanding without missing significant and key 
points. These difference can be understood through a lens of risk society, and we can understand 
the nature of the cyber domain,  and the conceptualization of risk and security by policy-makers 
and how it effects strategy. Ulrich Beck’s risk society theory has be influential and has been used 
in understanding modern warfare, the “transformation of war” debate, and policy decisions and 
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policy making. However, the concept has yet to be applied to the cyber domain in a 
comprehensive way. This thesis will explore the nature of the cyber domain through risk society 
theory, and explain the departure in treatment and understanding of security in the cyber domain.  
 
My main research question is how Estonian policy-makers and stakeholder understand and 
conceptualize risk in relation to cyber security, and what effect this has on the Estonian National 
Cyber Security Strategy. This research question had two sub-queries. The first asks how the 
cyber domain is different to other domains in regards to security. The second is what is the 
process that policy-makers go through in order to address these differences, and what are the 
results in the strategies themselves. I aim to understand the thought process behind cyber security 
strategy and policies of Estonia, and identify how the notion of security within the cyber sector is 
different to other sectors, and how security had changed in recent years. 
 
In this thesis I argue that the understand and treatment of security in the cyber domain has 
changed from what we have traditional seen in terms of national security. This department from 
traditional understanding of security translates into different handling of cyber security strategy. 
The cyber domain in which cyber security strategy seeks to secure is fundamentally different to 
other domains, and there is a keen grasp on this difference by policy-makers and by society as a 
whole. This change in understanding cannot be adequately understood by analyzing it through 
traditional notions of security. This change calls for a new lens of understanding. Ulrich Beck’s 
theory on Risk Society and New Modernity can help us understand how the understanding of 
security has changed in regards to the cyber domain, including multi-sector involvement and 
cultural understanding and perception of risk. I present Estonia as a case study, particularly 
discussing and analyzing Estonian policy-makers and stakeholders discourse on risk and security 
in regards to the cyber domain in order to demonstrate that these changes to cyber security are 
best understood through a lens of risk society.  
 
I have chosen Estonia as a case study due to the fact that it has one of, if not the most, mature 
cyber security strategies and cultures. This is due to several reasons. Firstly, Estonia began to 
develop its cyber capabilities and e-governance methods early on, allowing the government to 
get a head start as well as foster knowledge and esteem regarding the cyber domain. Secondly, 
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the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonian cyber space prompted a frenzy into action regarding cyber 
security, pushing Estonia into the spotlight and forcing the state to bulk up on its cyber security. 
Thirdly, due to both of these reasons, Estonia has established itself as an formidable expert on e-
governance, e-solutions, and cyber security, which in turn has brought expert and research 
capability back to Estonia. 
 
An emphasis on cyber capabilities and e-governance was establish early on in the priorities of 
the Estonian government, following re-independence. One stated reason for this emphasis was 
for cost-saving measures. Digital services save money in a number of ways, including personnel 
and decreased need of physical location. It has been reported that 2% of the GDP has been saved 
by going digital1. Early implementation of digital solutions had not only given Estonia a head 
start, but potentially also saved it from growing privacy debates2. As the rest of Europe and the 
world are soon to follow, they will no doubt face challenges regarding data sharing. However, 
Estonia has skipped this step, and e-ID and cross-sector leveling have already been implemented. 
 
The 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia brought world-wide attention to the potential risks of going 
digital, and spurred a reaction to bolster cyber security. In Estonia, this increased the awareness 
of the both the weaknesses in cyber security and risks that followed digitalization. The attacked 
prompted Estonia to continue to expand and improve cyber security, both from a strategic and 
logistical point of view. However, the 2007 attacks had another consequence, which was that it 
brought Estonia to the forefront of the international cyber security scene. Other countries became 
aware of Estonia’s digitalization, and they also became aware of the risks. The increased 
attention to Estonia, particular the reaction of the government, granted Estonia world wide 
attention. 
 
As a result, Estonia not only had the advanced e-solutions and the developed cyber security 
strategy that culminates in a mature cyber security culture, but it has the international recognition 
as such. Estonia has establish itself as an expert on e-government and cyber security, which in 
                                                
1 Statistic available at https://e-estonia.com/wp-content/uploads/updated-facts-estonia.pdf 
2 There are a number of factors to consider when discussing why Estonia developed digitally, which are beyond the 
2 There are a number of factors to consider when discussing why Estonia developed digitally, which are beyond the 
scope of this paper. For more information see Areng, Liina “Liliputian States in Digital Affairs and Cyber Security” 
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turn has attracted experts to Estonia. Estonia plays host to several security organizations, most 
notably the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCD COE). Significant 
documents such as the Tallinn Manual with suggestions, commentary, on international cyber 
security have been produced by experts in Estonia. All of this mean that Estonia is the best 
choice for a case study on cyber security, as it is the most mature and well-developed. 
 
Data for my empirical research will be collected through interviews, which will allow me to get 
an understanding on the discourse surrounding cyber security strategy and understanding of risk 
and security. Interviewees will come from both the public and private sectors, including 
government officials, researchers at academic institutions, and experts other security 
organizations . This will provide a well-rounded understanding of all discourse that influences 
cyber security strategy in Estonia. 
 
Interviews will be semi-structured, consisting of core questions slightly tailored to the 
individuals expertise or role. Questions will be focused on the interviewees understanding of 
cyber security, particularly how it is different to other forms of security, and underlying concepts 
of strategy. These questions will be designed to test for understanding and awareness of risk that 
is present in a risk society. There will also be an emphasis on the role of other sectors in cyber 
security, and the nature of policies, i.e. whether they are proactive or reactive. 
 
My research scope is limited in two ways. Firstly, it is limited to the Estonian perspective, how 
Estonia deals with and perceives risks. Secondly, it is limited to the cyber domain. These two 
limitations will focus my research. A potential difficulty I may face arises from the unavoidable 
nature of the cyber domain, which is global and does not have borders. Even though my research 
is limited to Estonia, it can only be limited to Estonian perspective given the global nature of 
cyber risks. This has the potential to make it difficult to distinguish between types of risks. 
Furthermore, a main characteristic of risk society is that is contains many unforeseen and 
unintended consequences, which also makes risk difficult to both quantify and predict. However, 
by focusing on the Estonian perspective, the keyword being perspective, this obstacle can be 
avoided. The theoretical characteristics of risk can be accepted, and focus is put on which risks 
that policy makers emphasize. 
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It is worth noting to limitations of Ulrich Becks’ risk society, which is used as a theoretical 
foundation for this paper. It is a macro sociological theory which some have argued is to vague. 
This makes the application of risk society both easier and trickier. It is easier because it can be 
applied to many different areas and many different types of research, and it’s macro nature 
allows for much interpretation. However, this presents some issues, namely that it is easier to 
manipulate to fit research and arguments, and may be stretched to unrelated areas. This paper 
addresses this issue and attempts to avoid fitting cyber security into an ill-fitting box by 
analyzing and describing cyber security first, then going on to discuss the application of risk 
society. In this way I hope to avoid oversimplification of cyber security conceptualization and 
address all the complexities and concepts that characterize it.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
With the growing emphasis on cyber in discussion of national security and international politics, 
there has come much discussion of it in the field of international relations. The treatment of the 
cyber domain and of cyber security has ranged from more practical discussions on how to treat it 
in a legal sense, to theoretical discussions on different frameworks which is best to understand 
the treatment of cyber in the political arena. The one thing that all literature on the cyber domain 
and cyber security seems to agree on is the fact that both are unique and require a special 
treatment.  
 
On the more practical side, legal scholars discuss emergence of the cyber domain as a major 
legal field in both national and international law and the difficulties that we face as we try to set 
up a framework. The Tallinn Manual, an immense study on the complexities of how international 
law applies to cyberspace, has been published by the CCD COE with a second edition soon to be 
published. Less specific and analytical articles have also been published by the CCD COE, 
which seek to clarify cyberspace as a domain or expand on discussion of cyber law (Schmitt and 
Vihul 2014). In “A Legal View on Outer Space and Cyberspace: Similarities and Differences”, 
Katrin Nyman Metcalf compares the nature of cyberspace to outer space, arguing that the two 
domain are “both cases dealing with areas that appear borderless, which means that traditional 
legal principles and rules based…specific borders, cannot apply or at least will be difficult to 
apply” (Nyman Metcalf 2018: 1). On the other hand, Alžbeta Bajerová conducts a more practical 
SWOT analysis of NATO including cyberspace as a new domain of operations, with a more 
traditional treatment of threats but a emphasis on cooperation between both sectors and states 
(Bajerova 2017: 10).  
More theoretical treatments of cyber security also exist in the literature with a large range of 
viewpoints and arguments. Liina Areng analyzes the growth of the importance of cyber security 
to Estonia, offering Small State Theory as an explanation of why Estonia has become a leader in 
cyber security internationally. In “Liliputian States in Digital Affairs and Cyber Security”, she 
argues that Estonia’s ‘small state’ attributes which often excludes states from being heavy lifters 
in the international sphere, such as its small population and relatively new government, have in 
 11 
turn allowed it to become a shining example of a digital state (Areng 2014). Lene Hansen and 
Helen Nissenbaum offer a completely different perspective on cyber security through 
securitization theory (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). They argue that “‘Cyber security’ can, in 
short, be seen as ‘computer security’ plus ‘securitization’”. They also discuss the difficulty of 
identifying specific traits or focuses of cyber security, including threats and referent objects, with 
much emphasis placed on the “wealth of referent objects”. Also using Estonia as a case study, 
Hansen and Nissenbaum examine the security language behind the securitizing of cyberspace in 
Estonia after the 2007 attacks, ultimately stating that securitization has been partially successful 
(ibid: 1170).    
There is a huge array of studies put out by the CCD COE on cyber security. In addition to the 
article already mentioned and the Tallinn Manual, the Centre also has published reports on the 
national cyber security structures of many nations, both NATO and non-NATO, providing in an 
depth look at the strategies in a structured and logical manner. “Ten Rules for Cyber Security” is 
another article published by the Centre which underscores ten different rule nations ought to 
follow when thinking about cyber security strategy . These ten rules are more abstract in nature 
and focus on broad concepts and ideas states ought to keep in mind, such as the ‘duty to care’ 
and the ‘access to information’ rules (Tikk 2011). On a more practical level, the Centre also 
published National Cyber Security Strategy guidelines, which provide more in depth and more 
concrete suggestions for states when actually drafting strategy.  
The literature on risk society is the opposite to that of cyberspace and security, in that it spans 
across different security topics and sector, but focuses on a single theoretical approach. Risk 
Society was initially theorized by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck in the early 1990’s, and he 
continued to expand and explore this theory alongside Anthony Giddens. Beck and Giddens own 
work on Risk Society is extensive and spans nearly two decades. This theory proves incredibly 
influential as is crossed disciplinary borders and permeated the literature on international politics 
and security studies. Beck’s initial work, which lays the foundation for the key concepts such as 
reflexive modernization, presence of the future, and the boomerang effect, spanned across many 
different topics, including environmental risk and terrorism. The literature on risk society is 
extensive.  
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Risk Society theory has been applied to many different specific areas of security, by both Beck 
and by others. In “The ‘Transformation of War’ Debate: Through the Looking Glass of Ulrich 
Beck’s World Risk Society”, Yee-Kuang Heng argues specifically that risk society provides a 
unique and superior framework with which to understand the changing nature of war. He focuses 
on four elements: ‘reflexive modernisation, the globalisation of risk, active anticipation and risk 
society’s minimalist ethos’. He uses the United States as a case study, analyzing statements and 
documents regarding attitude and decisions made by the government. Heng argues that risk 
society allows us to better understand both the changing nature of war and how states make 
decisions regarding war. Stefan Elbe briefly analyzes the HIV/AIDS epidemic through a risk 
society lens, putting particular emphasis on the presence of the future in HIV/AIDS discourse.  
He also links the concept of the ‘dangers of modernization’, arguing that the spread of 
HIV/AIDS has been made possible by the modern advances in transportation and increasingly 
globalized world (Elbe 2008: 10). Risk society has also been applied to the discussion on 
terrorism by several authors, included Beck himself (Beck 2002).  
These two literatures coincide in the discussion on risk and cyberspace put forth by Ronald J. 
Deibart and Rafal Rohozinski. In their article “Risking Security: Policies and Paradoxes of 
Cyberspace Security” they illuminate the gap in the discussion on risk in relation to cyber 
security, stating that while the academic and politicians alike agree on the risk to cyberspace, 
they ignore the concept of risks through cyberspace. They differentiate the two types of risk and 
treat them separately (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 24). Deibart and Rohozinski focus on the 
nature of risks themselves rather than apply the risk society framework in a comprehensive way, 
as Heng does with war.  
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CHAPTER 1: CYBERSPACE AS A DOMAIN 
 
This section seeks to describe cyberspace as a domain and lay out the characteristics which set it 
apart. It begins with defining and describing the key terms and concepts that are used in the 
discussion on ‘cyber’. It then goes on to discuss the borderless nature of the cyber domain and it 
effects. The nature of threats and risks which are present in the cyber domain, the actors 
involved, including the role of the private sector, and the non-physical nature of cyberspace is 
discussed in this section. Next it discusses the reflexive nature of cyber opportunity, then the role 
of cyber deterrence. Finally, it describes the proactive nature of cyber security strategy and 
policy and concludes with overarching themes.  
 
1.1 Defining Cyber 
 
There are many definitions floating around regarding the concept of ‘cyber’. Most nations 
employ their own definitions, understandings, and boundaries to what cyberspace is as a domain, 
and what ‘cyber security’ means to them. Some nations have much wider concepts of what cyber 
security pertains to, i.e. how far national cyberspace extends to and where they can draw lines. I 
will discuss some of the difference in these definitions and the reasons for them, followed by a 
more conceptual discussion on what the cyberspace is, in itself and as a domain. I will also 
discuss the question of ‘what is cyber security’ from a conceptual point of view. 
 
Firstly, we ask ‘what is cyberspace?’ Society often simply answers that cyberspace is ‘the 
internet’ and gives it no more thought, but if thinking about cyber from a security point of view, 
and if viewing it as its own domain, this is not clear enough. Most nations do employ more 
complex definitions for strategy purposes, including both the non-physical aspects as well as the 
physical aspects to describe what ‘cyberspace’ is. Here the definition comes from the Tallinn 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. ‘Cyberspace’ is: 
 
‘The environment formed by physical and non-physical components, characterized by the 
use of computers and electro-magnetic spectrum, to store, modify and exchange data 
using computer networks’.   
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Thus when we refer to ‘cyberspace’, we are talking about a vast interconnected system that 
encompasses the non-physical, i.e. the internet, and the actual physical systems which create this 
space. Cyberspace as a domain is a slightly more complicated matter due to this dual nature. 
Deibart and Rohozinski state that “in strategic terms, cyberspace is accepted now as a domain 
equal to land, air, sea, and space” but that it cannot be treated the same because of it is entirely 
human-made (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 16). Because of its non-physical nature, which 
makes up the majority of the domain, it is much more difficult to draw borders in cyberspace 
than it is in airspace or on land. As we will see later, this has a serious impact on the way in 
which cyber security functions.  
But what is cyber security? Again, nations employ many different definitions in strategies and 
documents, ranging in complexity. For example, Norway employs the simple definition as cyber 
security is the “protection of data and systems connected to the Internet”3. Estonia, on the other 
hand, has a more in depth definition: 
“It is an essential precondition for the securing of cyberspace that every operator of a 
computer, computer network or information system realizes the personal responsibility of 
using the data and instruments of communication at his or her disposal in a purposeful 
and appropriate manner. Estonia’s cyber security strategy seeks primarily to reduce the 
inherent vulnerabilities of cyberspace in the nation as a whole.” (CCD COE) 
 
This definition is more complex and encompasses some of the key ideas of cyber security which 
will be important in this paper.  
However, a definition put forward by national strategies are not sufficient to conceptualize what 
cyber security is from a security studies point of view. If we think about the very basic concept 
of security as ‘absence of threat towards acquired values’, we begin to see an potential issue with 
using traditional notions of what security is when pertaining to the cyber domain. We can indeed 
say that the acquired value being a digitalized state. We can also identify the referent object as 
                                                
3 This definition is very close to the common definition of information security: ‘the preservation of the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information’ (ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 27002: code of practice for information 
security management 2005). However, information security and cyber security should not be treated as 
interchangeable. For further elaboration see Von Somns.  
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national cyberspace, though this is where it begins to get fuzzy due to the difficulties in drawing 
succinct border in relation to ‘national cyberspace’. Hansen and Nissenbaum discuss the 
complexities of naming a distinct referent object, instead stating that there is a multitude of 
referent objects, including the internet, society, infrastructures, and many others (Hansen and 
Nissenbaum 2009: 1157).  
However, this overlooks the nature of the cyber domain, namely that there are inherent risks, or 
systemic risks, that can not be eliminated, only managed. Cyber security is the ongoing 
management of risks to and from cyberspace. Nations cannot ‘secure’ cyberspace for a number 
of reasons, elaborated further on, but must practice management of a domain of “constant 
transformation and a high degree of complexity” (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 16). By 
understanding cyber security as the management of risks, we acknowledge the nature of the 
cyber domain as it exists, and, I argue, we better understand the decisions policy-maker take and 
the key themes behind cyber strategy.  
Lastly, I define and discuss the term ‘cyber society’, which is a society which is dependent on 
the use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT). A cyber society has digitalized 
and incorporated ICT into its society, including government functions and everyday life such as 
banking, so that it cannot function without it. For a cyber society, cyber security is of utmost 
importance since it is reliant on cyberspace as its main domain of business of every sort. Not 
every state which employs ICT is a cyber society; there is a wide spectrum in terms of the degree 
of digitalization and reliance on ICT in modern society.  
 
 
1.2 Borderless Nature of Cyberspace/domain 
 
One of the key characteristics of the cyber domain is its lack of borders, which is expressed in 
several ways. The most obvious way in which cyberspace is borderless is the actually lacking of 
physical boundaries, at least in the traditional way we conceive of it in security. Traditional 
notions of security, specifically national security, are tied to territoriality. Indeed, national 
security depends on the integrity of a nation’s borders. However, cyber security is primarily the 
securing of cyber space, which, while it has of course physical roots, mostly consists of the 
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internet and things that we do not think of as being physical. Cyberspace is a separate domain in 
itself from physically territory (land, sea, air), one which does not have defined national ends and 
beginning (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 16). The non-physical nature of the cyber domain take 
away one of the safeguards that a state has in conventional security domains such as land of air, 
which is strategic depth. While kinetic warfare is limited by space and physical obstacles, cyber 
weapons are not (ibid).  
 
This lack of borders is because of the nature of the cyber realm in the first place. The most 
prominent feature of cyberspace, and of the internet, is it interconnectedness (Nyman Metcalf 
2018: 1; 11). The internet connects the government, the private sector, and civilians. Most 
importantly, it transcends national borders (ibid 3). It is difficult to distinguish national cyber 
systems and infrastructure, however to draw borders in ‘cyberspace’ is nearly impossible. 
Citizens in one country can use servers in other nations, pass and receive information to 
individuals across borders, and  (Areng 2014: 5). The sheer number of international interactions 
which are available to individuals in cyberspace cannot be accounted for in this paper. The point 
is that it is impossible to draw succinct and definite boundaries in cyberspace, and this has 
significant consequences for cyber security. It becomes more difficult, as I have stated, to define 
what cyber security entails in a national security sense (ibid 2). This is seen by the fact that many 
governments have different definitions and concepts of cyber security, which results in different 
national strategies.  
 
Because of this, national cyber security of any nation depends on the security of other nations as 
well. In this way, cyber security strategy cannot have concrete and inflexible ideas about what is 
or isn’t national cyberspace, since cyberspace is so interconnected. This aspect is highlighted in 
the NCSS, which states national cyber securities are intertwined, and because of this, cyber 
security strategies must consider the international aspects.  
 
The lack of common understanding in terms of what cyber security is and how a national cyber 
security strategy should entail can cause fragmentation in a domain where mutual understanding 
is necessary. If one nation has the understanding that cyber security entails that they only protect 
ICT, and its neighbor believes that cyber security means making sure that cyber actions of all 
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sectors be secure, this can jeopardize the cyber security of both nations, as international 
cooperation is vital in cyber security. Part of this difficulty has already been seen during the 
attacks on Estonia in 2007, which prompted much discussion on the triggering of Article 5 and 
whether cyber attack qualified. Article 5 states that allies are bound to defend one another in the 
case of aggression. However, debates over whether or not cyber attacks count as aggression, and 
if so, which attacks count and which do not, continued in the aftermath and continue to this day 
(Schmitt and Vihul 2014: 15). The lack of physical harm, though cyber attacks can result in this, 
makes it difficult to say (ibid 18). In addition to the complexities that cyber attacks have 
presented in terms of treaties, the new focus on cyber security has sparked a multitude of 
discussions on cyber law, including indetermination of jurisdiction based on the borderless-ness 
of cyber space as a domain.  
 
Another way in which the cyber domain can be described as being borderless is in regards to 
threat and risk. In the cyber domain it is both difficult to detect threats and to identify 
perpetrators when an attack has occurred. This is the case both in large scale attacks such 
breaches in governmental systems, or in smaller instances such as cyber crime. In the case of 
large scale attacks, it has been proven that it is very difficult to distinguish whom the aggressor 
is, and even more difficult to prove it, as it had been in the case of the 2007 attack on Estonia 
(O’Connell 2012: 152). Even if a state sanctions cyber attacks on another state, they may do so 
through either individuals or organized groups which have no association with the government , 
‘hacktivists’, and who might not even reside in either country, thus the physical location of an 
aggressor does not matter in some instances (Areng 2014: 5). The borderless nature of 
cyberspace allows cyber attacks to be conducted by anyone who has a certain skill set, which 
states do not have a monopoly on. In such cases, even if a state is believed to have funded or 
sanctioned an attack, it is very difficult to find proof. Large scale attacks need not be state 
sanctioned at all, however. ‘Hacktivist’ groups grow in number, and terrorist groups have 
attempted to use cyber tactics as well. These groups have the potential to cause great damage to a 
nation’s functioning cyberspace.  
 
Beyond large scale attacks, cyber security also entails the safety of day-to-day functions of 
cyberspace. In fact, cyber crime is often considered the biggest threat to cyber security, and to 
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the a functioning cyberspace. In theory, anyone with access to a computer, which is most of the 
world, has the potential to be a threat to cyber security. Cyber crime is constant and ever present, 
particularly in digitalized societies. But in relation to small scale attack, governments can also be 
involved in this, as can organized groups, and of course individuals. National cyber security, 
which entails the protection of the functioning of all cyberspace,  
 
In addition to not knowing exactly from whom the threats are coming from, it is also difficult to 
know what the threat itself is. The pace of innovation in the information age, particularly when it 
comes to cyber, evolves at a pace which is difficult to track. Innovation in computer technology 
occurs mostly in the private sector. Furthermore, group or individuals can engineer malware 
which government have no idea about.   
 
Essentially, a government does not know who will attack where, or with what. What this means 
is that for national security, the risk to cyberspace is omnipresent. Every system in the domain is 
at risk and threats come from every level. This makes it impossible to define threats to the cyber 
domain, and to strategize accordingly. Instead, cyber security must focus on securing or 
managing these risks to cyberspace, and think in terms of having a back up plan for every system 
to ensure the functioning of cyberspace. Cyber security ranges from securing military and 
government systems down to citizens securing online payment info. In a cyber society, security 
through management of individual citizens’ cyber activities is vital, since the functioning of 
society is dependent on ICT and cyberspace.   
 
I have already touched upon the involvement of individuals in national cyber security in this 
section, here I will expand on it. Individuals play a key role in cyber security in several ways, 
and can have a profound impact on the cyber domain, one being that individuals can possess the 
knowledge and skill sets to be a threat to national cyber security. However, individuals also play 
an important part in terms of what needs to be protected (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1171). 
When thinking of traditional national security, one which is primarily concerned with territorial 
integrity and physical safety of its population, the individual citizen sitting in their own home is 
not of direct consequence. However, this is the case with cyber security. The cyber activities of 
individuals need to be protected as well as infrastructures and data. This is important for all 
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societies, however it is essential for a cyber societies which conducts much of its business 
through the web.  
 
This creates an aspect to cyber security which is not prevalent in traditional national security: 
that citizens play an active role in it (Harknett and Stever 2009: 12). Cyber security policies and 
strategies must pay attention to the role and treatment of individuals (Hansen and Nissenbaum 
2009: 1171). Everyday systems and uses bare the brunt of both attacks and importance when it 
comes to cyber security. One of the consequences of this is that the population must be well 
aware of the risks, as well as have some basic level of knowledge of computer systems in order 
to curtail misuse and vulnerabilities. This point is made in the National Cyber Security Strategy 
guidelines published by the NATO CCDCOE, which outlines its suggestions and key points a 
nation should consider when drafting national cyber security strategies. The NCSS states that it 
is necessary for all levels of society to have a basic level of understanding and competence when 
it comes to cyber security, and strategy should accommodate this. Strategies ought to have 
defined plans for measuring cyber competence amongst a nations population in order to identify 
groups which are more at risk of cyber crime, and follow up with plans in order to fill these gaps 
in knowledge. In addition to this, states should consider specialized programs for educating 
cyber security experts and professionals.  
 
In addition to the involvement of individuals in cyber security, there is also the involvement of 
the private sector. The involvement of the private sector in matters of national security is not 
new. Private companies have long been granted government contracts in regards to military or 
infrastructure projects. However, the level of involvement of the private sector in cyber security 
is higher, and it is also necessary. Firstly, private companies, such as banks or health providers, 
who utilize digital transactions must be up to date with current technology, be aware of risks, and 
have sufficient firewalls and protection. Transactions between individuals and private 
companies, private companies and other private companies, and private companies and public 
institutions must be secure. This requires a high level of coordination and regulation as well. 
This is necessary because most of cyberspace is operated by the private sector (Harknett and 
Stever 2009: 2). Therefore a national cyber security strategy must consider how to secure the 
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private sectors systems as well, and importantly, and it must also focus on cooperation with the 
private sector in management of risks.  
 
Beyond the need for coordination and security in private ICT systems, the private sector is 
involved in the general public as well. The number of private e-solutions, e-governance, and ICT 
companies has grown exponentially, not only providing solutions to the private sector but also 
the public sector. These private companies often have the expertise that governments do not. 
Private companies consult on strategy and provide framework or solutions for ICT so that the 
intersection between public and private sector in cyberspace is difficult to separate, if at all 
(Harknett and Stever 2009: 10).  The NCSS guidelines suggest this as well, particularly that the 
private sector should be involved in the decision-making process when developing strategy and 
solutions in order to get all relevant experience possible. In actuality, the involvement of the 
private sector in the way and beyond seems unavoidable when drafting strategy and when 
implementing it. This inclusion of the whole of society is dubbed the ‘Cybersecurity Triad’ by 
Harknett and Stever, with the three parts being the government, the private sector, and the 
‘cybercitizen’ (11). They state that the ‘triad’ is necessary in order to create a resilient cyber 
security, elsewise important areas which are not treated in traditional security notions could be 
ignored (5).  
 
As cyberspace extends into other sectors of society, cyber security also extends into other 
domains of security (Harknett and Stever 2009: 8; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009: 1157). Cyber 
security has a direct impact on anything that is influenced or maintained by ICT, which includes 
but is not at all limited to infrastructure such as energy systems and military and defense 
systems. In all societies national security is tied to cyber security, and in a cyber society, national 
security is dependent on it (Harknett and Stever 2009: 3). As it is important to include the private 
sector in strategy, it is also important to include stakeholders from other security sectors, such as 
military or energy (NCSS). Cyber security includes the security of all of cyberspace, which 
extends to other sectors. In fact, all political and military affairs now contain some level of cyber 
dimension (Geers 2009: 2). This means that cyber security is also borderless in terms of sector.   
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Physical size and population does not have a direct effect on cyber security (some may say 
negative: small states may have an easier time regularizing cyber systems and securing 
cyberspace than a larger country with many systems and players. It is easier to innovate in a 
small state). Traditionally, larger and more populous states are more powerful due to having 
more resources, and larger territories are more difficult to conquer. Such has always been the 
case. However, in cyberspace the size of territory does not determine the cyber capabilities of a 
state, nor does the population. A small country may be weak militarily, but be more advanced in 
terms of cyber capabilities than its much larger neighbor, and therefore carry more weight 
internationally in regards to cyber issues. Furthermore, because physical distance has a deflated 
significance in cyberspace, states have a global reach and platform much easier (Areng 2014: 5).   
 
The cyber domain is separated by its borderless nature. It lacks clear boundaries in many 
respects: boundaries in terms of threats, actors, levels, and physical borders. This makes the 
concept of comprehensive security a reality, cyber security is truly comprehensive security 
which an entire society much participate in to achieve. While other forms of security may share 
similarities, none can be wholly describe as borderless as cyber security it. The domain in which 
cyber security operates, cyberspace, is lacking in physical boundaries yet it bares many 
characteristics of a physical security domain. It can be treated a vital, and perhaps most 
important, part of national security while also having the need for new concepts of national 
security and new ways of approaching policy and strategy making.  
 
1.3 Cyber Opportunity  
 
Another things that sets the cyber domain apart from other types of domains of security, and 
therefore the treatment of cyber security by states, is its reflexive nature. Rather than threats 
being generated from outside of the border, threats are generated from a states innovation. The 
threats that we face in cyberspace, whether it be cybercrime, threats to national cyber 
infrastructure, or cyber attacks, only exist because we have created cyberspace in the first place 
(Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013: 100).  The level of cyber risk is dependent on how advanced 
a societies digital space it, the more advance it is the more they are at risk (Hansen and 
Nissenbaum 2009: 1155). This is especially the case when it comes to cyber societies, who 
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depend on ICT for the functioning of the state. These states face more risk in terms of cyber 
security than a state which is less developed in terms of digitalization. The cyber capabilities of 
others is significant as well, a individual, group, or nation is a risk only when they too possess 
equal or better capabilities. However, the capabilities of others is inconsequential if a state 
doesn’t have a developed digital infrastructure. Today, every nation has some level of 
digitalization therefore every state is at least somewhat at risk. The unique aspect is that more 
advanced societies are more at risk than less advanced societies. This is the case in regards to 
both risks from other actors (cybercrime, cyber attacks, etc), but also basic malfunctions and 
failures that pose a risk.  
 
This is not the case in regards to traditional domains of security, and national security strategies. 
Usually when we think of national security, what is already there dictates much of how strategy 
is formed. Who your neighbors are, what current political climates are like, all contribute to 
strategy. This goes for cyber security as well, but what exists already is less important. The cyber 
capabilities of a neighboring state, or a hostile group or individual, is less of threat if you do not 
depend on ICT that much. Also, if your digital infrastructure is not advanced or cutting edge, you 
may not be susceptible to new technologies problems that might effect countries whose 
infrastructure is. On the other hand, a nation without nuclear capabilities can still be attacked 
with them.  
 
Much of the risk towards cyberspace does not stem from potential cyber attacks, but from normal 
system failures where there is no perpetrator or attacker (O’Connell 2012: 191). The risk is 
created through the digitalization itself. When a new technology is introduced, new ways in 
which it can fail follow suit. Computer viruses would not exist without computers. So even 
though advances in cyberspace and digital systems brings a wealth of societal benefits, it also 
brings many risks and challenges that are new for society. The risk of someone across the world 
gaining access to your personal information is a risk that is only possible because of the advances 
in the cyberspace. The internet allows us to communicate more efficiently, but it also aids in the 
spread of misinformation. Every innovation in cyber technology brings both positive effects as 
well as negative effects, which we as a society do not also know or account for. Policy makers 
are aware of this characteristic, and acknowledge it in strategies and in their understanding of 
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cyber security. The NCSS guidelines highlights this, stressing that nations should be aware of 
this characteristic when drafting strategy (NCSS 10). 
 
1.4 Cyber Deterrence  
 
Deterrence is an important topic when it come to national security. Deterrence is the concept of 
stopping an attack before it even begins and is often a key part of security strategy. This usually 
includes the building up of capabilities and pursuing one or both of the following concepts: 
deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by denial seeks to build up a 
nation’s capabilities so that potential adversaries doubt that they can cause harm, while 
deterrence by punishment seeks to stop attackers based on fear of retribution (O’Connell 2012: 
187). This concept is mostly obvious in regards to traditional and military national security, 
particularly in discussion and strategies regarding nuclear weapons. In relation to cyber security, 
deterrence by denial would consist of building up a nations cyber defense system to the point 
where attackers would not try. With deterrence by punishment, this might include a system of 
cyber offensive abilities and somehow showcasing these abilities.  
 
However, cyber deterrence by these terms is muddled. Firstly, deterrence strategy is usually 
geared towards military attacks, where the actors are mostly states and the attacks are physical. 
Deterrence in these circumstances includes building up militaries and defensive systems, and 
vocalizing one’s willingness and ability to retaliate. Cyber attacks may have physical 
consequences, but for the most part it is systems and digital infrastructure in cyberspace that is at 
jeopardy. Additionally, as stated before, potential cyber attacks are brought on by actors other 
than the state very often. An individual or a group is less likely to be put off by a governments 
heavy duty firewall system than a state. Also, because it is very difficult to track perpetrators of 
cyber attacks, deterrence by punishment is more difficult as well. If any actor, state, group, or 
individual, understand that there is a small chance that a state will be able to prove that they are 
responsible, then they will not fear retribution and deterrence by punishment will be 
unsuccessful. 
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Finally, deterrence strategy is all about deterring potential attackers. However, the biggest risk to 
cyberspace is not outside aggressors, but system failures that occur at the fault of no one. Unlike 
traditional security domains, risk is manufactured by the state itself, and the threats that the cyber 
domain faces does not actually have an actor to deter. In this case deterrence strategy is 
completely useless. This means that while deterrence may be a part of a cyber security strategy, 
it won’t be of vital importance, since cyber attacks are not the only focus of cyber security. This 
in itself calls for a rethinking of national security strategy in relation to the cyber domain. States 
cannot simply apply similar strategy frameworks to the cyber domain and adapt deterrence 
strategy. Doing so would result in an anemic strategy which would poorly prepare a country in 
terms of cyber security, and would not encompass the nature of cyberspace (Barajevá 2017: 15).  
 
That being said, deterrence is still at play in cyber security, but in a different way. The 
establishment of the NATO CCDCOE in 2004, which was founded on the idea of cooperative 
defense between NATO countries can be viewed as a method of deterrence. The centre focuses 
on training, research, and developing in order to bolster the cyber defense methods of allies. (In 
the CCDCOE’s NCSS guidelines, there is very little mentioned about deterrence in strategy). 
Cyber security is a relatively new phenomenon, which means that experts and academic are 
trying to fully understand how it works and how to achieve it (Goodman 2010: 106). Cyber 
defense is still an important aspect of cyber security, which includes setting up barriers against 
potential attackers, but it is an ongoing learning process for policy makers.  
 
1.5 Proactive Versus Reactive Policies 
 
The features of the cyber domain change the way that nations must consider cyber security 
strategy and policy. Often national security strategies are grounded in past experiences and 
potential threats that are perceived by the nation. In this way strategy and policy are reactive in 
nature, as policy makers are reacting to past events and basing future actions on experience and 
history. However, cyber security strategy is not reactive, but proactive. Strategies and policies 
seek to lay out a spectrum of preventative measures in order to deal with a myriad of potential 
attacks and failures in cyberspace (Geers 2009: 7; Tikk 2011: 2). They choose to focus on things 
that might happen rather than things that have happened. One reason for this is because 
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cyberspace is a relatively new domain of interest in terms of national security, so there is a lot of 
history to shape strategy and policy.  
 
This is not to say that all actions taken in the name of cyber security are proactive in nature. The 
famous cyber attacks that occurred in Estonia in 2007 prompted many nations to consider cyber 
security more seriously, so technically states are reacting to past events (Czosseck et al 2011). 
However, cyber strategy is not based off of a single event. National cyber strategies are not 
singularly crafted to respond to the famous cyber attacks, but rather to be ready to deal with 
anything. The attack showed the world that you do not know when an attack is going to happen 
and must be prepared at all times.  
 
The proactive nature of cyber security strategy is also seen in strategy and policy not geared 
towards attacks, but towards reflexive cyber opportunity. As illustrated above, cyber security is 
not solely or even mostly about securing cyberspace from attackers, but from system failures and 
malfunctions. There is also a lack of experience in this for most governments. There has not been 
a massive ICT failure upon which strategy making could react too. Even ignoring this, however, 
the nature of cyberspace in that with every new innovation comes new problems, it would be 
unwise to focus on past events to shape current strategy. Instead, cyber security strategy must 
focus on countering the issues and potential problems that come with new innovation, and how 
to handle the unexpected.  
 
The proactive stance towards policy and strategy is realized through the idea of cyber resilience. 
Cyber resilience stresses the importance of having a systems which can withstand attacks and 
malfunctions without widespread difficulties. This usually includes back up systems and 
alternative solutions, so that if a system goes down or something is compromised, then there is 
another system waiting to pick up (Geers 2009: 7; Harknett and Stever 2009: 12). The NCSS 
guidelines also stress the importance of cyber resilience in national cyber security strategy, 
stating that implementing the idea of resilience includes being aware of the risks of malfunctions 
and the level of dependence on ICT so that these problems can be addressed. Another way in 
which strategy takes a proactive stance is by practicing “good cyber hygiene”, which includes 
informing the population on safe internet practices. (O’Connell 2012: 206). 
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employ a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) which is tasked with dealing with 
emergencies related to ICT and cyberspace. These teams respond incidents of all natures, both in 
case of cyber attacks, malfunctions, or system failures. The point of these teams is to be prepared 
for any sort of emergency occurring in the nations cyberspace. 
 
Another way in which proactive nature of cyber security strategy can be seen through the idea of 
prevention. This includes the concept of deterrence, but also can be seen in the goal of cyber 
hygiene amongst the population. The concept of awareness amongst the civilian population is an 
important one all throughout cyber security strategy, but it has a role to play in regards to 
prevention (Harknett and Stever 2009: 12). Firstly, correct usage of ICT leads to more efficient 
usage and reduces the risk of user-based issues. Secondly, awareness of the potential risks by the 
population, such as awareness to keep passcodes private and to be wary of phishing, decreases 
the instances of cybercrime.  
 
Proactive cyber security strategy and policy encompass the characteristics of the cyber domain. 
Cyberspace is a domain which is characteristic by inherent and systemic risk, which in turn 
forces policy-makers to draft cyber security strategy to look forward and be prepared for 
anything, particularly because of how much can go wrong on many different levels. This is 
distinct from other security domains, specifically traditional national security, which are more 
focused and had defined threats that are addressed. The cyber domain as a security domain in 
unique in that the threat is constant and unknown, the actors are often untraceable, and risk is 
generated from cyberspace itself. This creates a concept of cyber security which must focus on 
the management of these risks through resilience of their systems and awareness of the 
populations. 
 
1. 6 Conclusion 
 
The cyber domain lacks the clear boundaries and characteristics which changes the concept of 
cyber security, steering it away from traditional notions of security. The cyber domain is 
inherently borderless in nature, lacking first and foremost physical boundaries and being 
impossible to clear set national borders. The strategizing and implementation of security is no 
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longer contained at the state level in the cyber domain, but must include the whole of society, 
and thus it lacks borders in that respect as well. There is also a lack of defined threats to the 
cyber domain, and it is instead characterized by constant risk, known and unknown, borne from 
cyberspace itself. The innovation and advances that a society makes in cyberspace also threatens 
the security of that same space, creating a never ending cycle of risk. These characteristics all 
culminate in a proactive approach to cyber security strategy and policy, which emphasizes 
resilience and preparedness, rather than addressing specific threats.   
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CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING CYBER SECURITY THROUGH RISK SOCIETY 
 
I have argued that cyber security cannot be efficiently understood through traditional theories of 
security. In this section I discuss Ulrich Beck’s social theory of risk society, and argue that the 
key concepts in this theory can equip up to best understand the nature of the cyber domain and 
cyber security. I start off with a brief introduction to risk society, including defining key terms 
and concepts within the theory, including reflexive modernity, presence of the future, and the 
role of the private sector. I then directly apply this to the characteristics of cyber security as 
described above, and argue that Beck’s theory on risk society is the most appropriate theory to 
analyze cyber security.  
 
2.1 Risk Society 
 
Risk Society and Reflexive Modernity 
 
Ulrich Beck’s theory on risk society came into the spotlight in the 1990’s as a sociological theory 
on modernization and risk.  Beck theorized that society was moving into a ‘new modernity’, or 
second modernity as it has sometimes been called, which was distinct from what we understand 
as simply ‘modernity’. New modernity was one in which society was governed by systemic risks 
and modern institutions, and one which is less defined by borders and boundaries (Beck, Bonss, 
Lau 2003: 4). A risk society is aware of these characteristics, most importantly the risks which 
govern it.  
 
Many different definitions of varying complexity and significance have been put forward 
recently due to popularity on the concept of ‘risk’ and security. However, the one employed by 
Beck, and also by this paper, is not overly complex. Risk can be defined as “hazards and 
insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (Beck 1992: 21). There is no need 
to overly theorize the concept of risk, but there is a need to differentiate from risk from threat. 
Whereas a risk has the potential to cause harm, a threat has both the potential and intent. While 
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traditional security communities focuses on specific threats, a risk society focuses on risk, i.e. 
what could happen, and how to manage the multitude of risks that arise in a modern society. 
Therefore, a risk society is one which has become aware and apprehensive about of the existence 
of these dangers – not just a society in which these dangers are present (Beck 2003: 21). 
Humans have always been at risk, but what sets this type of risk apart is the origin of risk. Risks 
such as natural disasters or diseases have always loomed over humanity. However, neither of 
these risks have been created by society. Now, industrialization has created potentially grave 
environmental risks, medical advances such as antibiotics have created antibiotic-resistant strains 
of diseases. These risks have been manufactured by humans; they simple would not exist without 
human society. This is what is meant by ‘systemic risks’; they are risks that are generated from 
the modern institutions that we as a society have created.  
Another defining characteristic of this type of risk is its inherently global nature, which 
particularly applies to security and challenges conventional notions (beck 1992: 34). Risks 
manufactured in the new modern times does not have boundaries, they are global in nature. 
Conventional security often thinks in terms of the security dilemma, where one state’s security 
means another’s insecurity, however this concept is not present in security thought within a risk 
society. National security can never be completely disentangled from the security of other states. 
And while state’s cannot think in terms of ‘security for the human race’, security from 
manufacture threats such as pollution and totally drug-resistant tuberculosis benefits all nations.  
The concept that risk within a risk society is propagated by the society’s modernization is called 
reflexive modernity. As we as a society continue to modernize and advance, we inherently create 
new risks that we can not predict (Beck, Lau, Bons 2003: 17). This has always been the case, as 
society’s actions have always had consequences. The differentiating factor is that we are now 
aware of this fact. The difference between pre-modern times and the new modernity is this 
awareness. For example, industrialization has created numerous risks that we must deal with in 
current time. However, when initially industrializing, society was not aware of the potential risks 
it would create, nor that modernization itself inherently created risk. In a risk society, we are 
aware of the fact that industrialization cause risks: both that it harms human health and had 
potentially irreversible side effect to the environment and that there is a multitude of risk that 
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may accompany it that we cannot foresee. This awareness is what creates a risk society. 
Awareness of reflexive modernity and the risk that accompanies it is operationalize in a society 
through its decision making process and its strategies and policies (Elbe 2008: 10). Being aware 
of a vast array of risks brought on by modernization, emphasis is placed on preparedness and 
management of those risks (Krahmann 2010: 349). Policies and strategies become less focused 
on specific threats and focus on potential risks. In security strategy and policy specifically, this 
means that strategies and policies become more proactive in nature rather than reactive. When 
employing traditional understanding of security, policy is more reactive in nature, responding to 
threats. In this case, strategy and policy is often shaped by past events. A previous invasion or 
hostility with a certain state can come to influence policy direction greatly. In a risk society, 
however, there is less focus on what has happened in the past and more focus on what could 
happen in the future, which creates a presence of the future which can be detected in the policies 
and strategies of a risk society. Risk societies are governed by the future, not the past. The 
emphasis become risk management and planning for future risks as opposed to addressing 
specific threat.  
 
The Role of the Private Sector in a Risk Society 
The role of the private sector within a risk society, particularly related to risk management, is 
unique and departs from the traditional role. The pervasiveness of risk management in a risk 
society creates a important role for private solutions companies, one which they happily fill as 
well as exacerbate. With an emphasis on risk management, the key is the word management. 
While the private sector sells solutions, they are involved in the management not solving of risks, 
which continued to create business for the private sector. In essence, Beck states that “risks are 
no longer the dark side of opportunities, they are also market opportunities” (Beck 92: 46). 
More than being heavily involved in risk management, the private sector actually propagates risk 
society. The first way in which is does this is through reflexive modernity, just like all other 
modernization (Krahmann 2010: 352). The growing capitalist market creates risks, both known 
and unknown, which can be applied to all areas in modern society. However, this difference in 
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the private sector is that it is knowingly and purposefully contributing to these risks by 
proliferating, and perhaps exaggerating, the risks brought on by modernization. If the market 
thrives on risk, the more risk the better. This creates a ‘culture of fear’, which in turn makes 
more business for private companies and expands their roles within the sector (Krahmann 20120: 
358; Aradau 2008: 151).  
In traditional ideas of security, particularly in the military sector, there is often involvement of 
private companies. However, this cooperation is often contractual and formal. In a risk society, 
the involvement of private security companies is less formal and more incorporated. Part of this 
is to do with the fact that the growing market for risk solutions from private sector to public 
sector, so that the private sector tends to amass a substantial number of experts. A common trend 
is that more experienced and qualified security experts cross over to private sector after years in 
the public sector. As a result, the public sector seeks out the expertise of the private sector, which 
has varied knowledge of experts.  
The demand for private solutions is encouraged by the unknown nature of risks within a risk 
society. While the public sector may be more than capable of identifying and planning for risks 
that they foresee, a second opinion is always beneficial. The more potential risks that are 
identified and managed, the better. This creates an opportunity for the private sector to identify 
risks (Krahmann 2010: 366).  
 
2.2 Understanding the Borderless Nature of Cyber Security  
 
I have argued at length that the borderless nature of the cyber domain it one of its defining 
features. This includes the lack of physical boundaries, the lack of sectoral boundaries, and lack 
of defined threats and risks. Such is the case within a risk society. A risk society is characterized 
by the blending of traditional borders, which is what occurs in cyber security (Beck 1992: 101). 
Cyberspace is has no true borders. While it is true that nations do draw lines and attempt to 
define what ‘national cyberspace’ is, this is on more of a surface level and cannot ever truly be 
achieved. Cyber security is a man-made domain which is not entirely physical, and does not 
obey national borders. This includes the question of where does cyber security end? Securing 
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cyberspace effect an entire society, from banking to military to energy. Nor does it effect these 
things indirectly, but rather directly. Cyber security must encompass all of these things, and the 
more digitalized a society is, the more interconnected it becomes. So as the need for cyberspace 
grows, and states develop cyber security, the boundaries become less and less defined.  
 
Likewise, the blurring of traditional boundaries applies to the lack of specific threats and actors 
within cyber security, specifically in terms of actors. As discussed previously, a striking 
difference in the cyber domain as a security domain is that everyone has the potential to be a 
threat, and therefore everyone is a risk (Hansen and Nissembaum 2009: 1171). This includes 
both individuals inside and outside of national borders. This is a significant departure from 
traditional notions on threat. In the cyber domain there are no definite boundaries on who or 
what is a threat or not, and this has significant implications on the way cyber security strategy is 
both understood and the way it is handled. Analyzing the characteristics of the cyber domain and 
the implications they have on the way cyber security through a lens of risk society helps us to 
understand why strategy has become more proactive, risk-focused, and included more 
stakeholder in the process.  
 
Lastly, the close collaboration between the private and public sector in regards to cyber security 
is something that we do not see in traditional security sector. Yes, there have always been 
military contracts between the private sector and the public sector, but this level of involvement 
is beyond that. We can not explain the role of the private sector, which is not just important but 
necessary, through traditional security theory. However if we look at it from a risk society point 
of view, we can see that this level of involvement is to be expected in a domain such as the 
cyber, which is characterized by the blurring of traditional borders.  
 
Cyber security is approached in a holistic manner, in which both the public, private and civilian 
sectors are considered and included. I have expounded on the significance of the private sector 
both in cyber security, and its significance within risk society theory. The private sector is 
involved in the strategy and policy making process, and it considered a vital part. The private 
sector has huge significance in terms of the implementation of strategy and policy, since much, 
and in many cases most, of cyberspace is operated by private companies. Therefore the 
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significance of including the private sector in the process and implementation is of utmost 
importance. The importance of considering the civilian population cannot be understated. Every 
individual behind a computer is a risk, but they are also an important part of securing cyberspace 
and perhaps the biggest tool. Cyber awareness and cyber hygiene focus on educating the 
population of a country so that they may decrease the risk associated with common usage and 
protect themselves and others. The key element here is that individual are directly involved in 
maintaining (and threatening) cyber security. Every last individual must be included and 
considered in the process and implementation of cyber security, from strategy and policy to 
implementation.      
 
2.3 Cyber Opportunity as Reflexive Modernity  
 
Beck’s definition of risk fits the characterization that is dealt with in cyber security. The ‘risk’ in 
a ‘risk society’ is one which is generated by the system itself, the very system that it threatens 
(Elbe 2008: 8; Beck 1992: 21; 2003). This is exactly the case within cyberspace. This risk that 
cyber security faces and must address comes from the advancement of cyber technology and 
would not exist without it. While it seems obvious that malware and cyber attacks would not 
exist without the existence of cyberspace, we must remember that this is not the case with other 
domains of security. A nation’s territory is threatened by its neighbors’ military aggressive 
regardless of it’s own military advancements. Systemic risk is what plagues cyber security for 
both nations and global cyberspace. The risk of both cyber attacks and cyber malfunctions and 
malware are both systemic. This also correlates to the fact that cyber societies are more 
vulnerable than those which are less dependent on ICT, against stressing the idea that cyber 
opportunity is reflexive (Deibart and Rohozinski 2010: 19). Digitalization brings about many 
benefits and connects us globally, however there is a risk associated with each benefit, both 
known and unknown. In addition to the self-generated risk which characterizes cyber security, it 
is also often does not have a specific aggressor, but rather risk that features common 
malfunctions (ibid 24). Traditional security studies cannot be used to adequately understand and 
analyze cyber security, as it does not account for the origin of these risks and the effects they 
have on strategy and policy.  
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2.4 Private Sector in Cyber Security 
 
The theorization of the role of the private sector in a risk society also aligns with that of cyber 
security. Because of the emphasis on risk management in particular, the involvement of the 
private sector is ongoing and never ending (Krahmann 2010: 352). In a risk society the inclusion 
of the private sector is much more informal and incorporated, which can be seen in cyber 
security. As I have discussed, the involvement of the private sector is of monumental 
importance. This is due to the borderless nature described above, but also because of the 
expertise that private companies bring to the strategy table. If the private sector is the origin of 
much of the cyber innovation in a society, than they are also the origin of innovation in terms of 
solutions and protecting cyberspace (ibid 365). In a risk society the private sector both creates 
and manages the systemic risk. This is what we observe in cyber security. The private sector 
advances cyber technology, therefore creating more risk, then becomes involved in the process 
of managing that risk. The private sector is involved in strategy and policy making, but also 
involved in consulting in technical terms and providing technical risk management.  
 
 
2.5 Presence of the Future and Cyber Security Strategy  
 
The borderless and reflexive nature of cyber security culminates in proactive strategy and policy 
which focuses on resilience. Another way of describing this quality is by stating there is a 
presence of the future in cyber security strategy and policy. In my discussion on the nature of 
cyber security strategy in chapter 1, I stated that rather than being reactive in nature, cyber 
security strategy is proactive, meaning that it is forward looking and seeks to address the 
unknown risks which plague cyberspace (Beck, Bonss, Lau 2008: 9). In this way, cyber security 
mirrors risk society and shows that that there is the presence of the future in strategies and 
policies, meaning that the future and what could happen, shapes and guides strategy (Harkett and 
Stever 2009: 2). This is in contrast to reactive policies, which are guided by past events and have 
a presence of the past. This is necessary in cyber security strategy due to its reflexive nature. 
Because of the systemic risks which are created by digitalization, it is impossible to make a 
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strategy which solely responds to specific threats. Instead, strategy must be ready for anything 
that the future might bring, and most importantly, be ready for action when things fail. This is 
where cyber resilience comes in; ICT must be agile and able to withstand constant attacks and 
malfunction of all nature, and when a system fails, there must be a back up in order to ensure 
society’s functioning. However, this is not to say that cyber security strategy is exclusively 
forward look, but is rather both forward looking and conscious of past events.  
 
This presence of the future which is seen in proactive approaches to cyber security is influenced 
by both the borderless nature and the reflexive opportunity observed in cyberspace. Cyber 
security strategy must be governed by the future, because of its reflexive nature. There is not 
going back in terms of digitalization, only forwards, which means that both innovation and risk 
will continue to grow. Cyber security must be prepared for these systemic risks which are borne 
out of advances in cyber technology. This is stressed in strategic documents, specific in the 
NCSS guidelines. Safeguarding cyberspace from the vast myriad of risks is of utmost 
importance. Additionally, the need for preparedness is seen in the establishment of CERTs, 
which is an essential part of any nations cyber security strategy.   
 
Lastly, we arrive to perhaps one of the most important points and strongest examples for why the 
cyber domain and why cyber security is better understood through a lens of risk society, which is 
the fact that society is aware of these characteristics. Because there is a clear presence of the 
future in the conception of cyber security, this means that strategy and policy makers are aware 
of the reflexive nature of cyberspace, and aware that they must be ready for new risks and threats 
which emerge from it (Beck, Bonss, Lau 2008: 18). The emphasis on risk management is an 
example of this awareness. Policy makers are aware the risk to cyberspace cannot be eliminated 
because it is self-generated and never ending (Harknett and Stever 2009: 29). The risk can only 
be managed and planned for, but not stopped. This awareness is reflected in all society, from the 
private sector to the civilian population, who are included in the maintenance and upkeep of a 
states cyber security. This awareness is what defines a risk society and characterizes the nature of 
strategy and policy with the society.  
 
2. 6 Conclusion 
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Ulrich Beck’s theory on risk society is the most appropriate theory to explain the nature and 
functioning of cyber security, and the strategy and policy which emerges. The borderless nature 
of cyber security, including the lack of defined threat or actor, the total involvement of a society 
in the security process, and the reflexive nature of cyber opportunity are all characteristics which 
are descriptive of a risk society. The discourse which surrounds cyber security shows the 
awareness of these attributes, exemplifying the fact that society is aware of the risk which 
characterizes cyberspace. State’s understanding and the nature of strategy and policy show that 
cyber security is best understood when observed from a lens of risk society.   
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CHAPTER 3: ESTONIAN CYBER SECURITY 
 
In this chapter I will present my research findings. I begin with a discussion on the methodology 
of my research and my reasoning for choosing to gather data through interviews. I also provide a 
detailed explanation of my interviewing process, including my criteria for interviewees, 
interview structure, and method of analysis. I then discuss my findings at length and argue that 
Estonian policy-makers and stakeholders conceptualize the cyber domain differently to 
conventional security domains, and that this has a profound impact on the way that they 
understand risk and security within cyber. These understanding reflect in the handling and 
planning of cyber security strategy. This departure is best understood through analysis using a 
risk society framework.  
 
 
3.1 Methodology and Analysis  
 
This dissertation is a case study on Estonian cyber security, focusing on the understanding of 
Estonian cyber security policy stakeholders regarding cyber security. The basis of risk society 
stems from the understanding and perception of the society itself. Rather than a threat-based, 
reactive concept of security strategy and policy, a risk society in one which is preoccupied with 
the future, and is aware of the risks that are created by its continued modernization. The purpose 
of this research paper is to study the understanding of security and risk by Estonian policy-
makers and stakeholders, and how this understanding has departed from traditional notions. I 
argue that the understanding and treatment of cyber security is fundamentally different, and these 
differences are best understood through a lens of risk society theory.  
 
In this section I follow a similar structure that I have in chapters 1 and 2. I trace the 
characteristics of the cyber domain and their effects on cyber security strategy, analyzing the 
discourse of Estonian policy-makers through this lens.  Firstly, Estonian policy-makers and 
stakeholders ar aware that of the reflexive nature of cyber opportunity, meaning that they are 
aware that as Estonian continues to digitize, this will continue to create risks, both known and 
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unknown. This awareness would not be as readily shown in formal documents or papers as it 
would in discussing cyber security with individual policy makers.  
 
Secondly, the understanding is translated into policy and strategy. Strategy and policy is focused 
on concepts such as alternate solutions, cyber resilience, and general adaptability of the cyber 
security structure of Estonia. These policy characteristics are identifiable in cyber documents, 
however its is the process of understanding and its translation which must be traced.  
 
Thirdly, an understanding of the lack of traditional borders of cyber security is apparent. This is 
something that is best to be discussed and understood through interviews, as it is not always 
possible to detect in policy and strategy. A emphasis on the importance of the involvement of the 
whole of society, or mention of need to keep citizens up to date and aware of the evolving 
technologies and risks, may not be present in cyber security strategy. Also, an emphasis on the 
importance of promoting e-solutions and ICT in both the European and international community 
may not be apparent. And the implication of the importance of promoting Estonia’s own cyber 
structure and e-solutions, as well as Estonian companies, may be visible in strategy.  
 
In order to support my argument that Estonian understanding of security pertaining to the cyber 
domain has changed, and is best understood through a lens of risk society theory, I conducted 
interviews. My goal was to capture to understanding of Estonian policy-makers and stakeholder 
regarding the nature of the cyber domain and the formation of strategy. I interviewed experts 
have contributed, influenced, and built the cyber security strategy and structure of Estonia. The 
reason I chose to collect data via interviews is due to the fact that it was the best way to get a 
firm grasp on the understanding behind policy and strategy. Simply examining policy and 
strategy would be inadequate in grasping the concept of security behind it, particularly the 
involvement of other sectors and of other parts of society.   
 
My interviewees are from a wide range of Estonian institutions and sectors, including public, 
intergovernmental, and academic.  In the public sector, interviewees are experts who have 
consulted, studied and drafted cyber security documents, manuals and strategies in Estonia. I had 
several different ways in which I found and decided upon my interviewees. The first step was to 
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contact individuals who held positions regarding cyber security at government ministries and 
research institutions and contact them via emails. This was mostly successful. The second way in 
which I chose interviewees was through examination of strategy and other important documents 
pertaining to cyber security and noting reoccurring names of experts who had done substantial 
drafting of strategy or research on cyber security. The final way in which I got into contact was 
from the recommendation of those who I had already interviewed.  
 
Interviews are semi-structured, with 6 questions being prepared before hand on average, and 
lasting 30 – 45 minutes. The majority of interviews were conducting in person at the 
interviewees place of work, with (one) being conducted over Skype. Questions run along the 
lines of asking the interviewees perceptions of cyber security and it’s key features, the nature of 
cyber policies and strategy, and the actors in cyber security. The core questions are as follows: 
1) Is cyber security different to other areas of security? 
a. How does this translate to strategy and policy? 
2) Are cyber security strategies and policies more focused on addressing specific threats or 
being prepared? 
3) Who is involved in the strategy making process? 
a. How is the private sector/other government sectors involved? 
4) How engaged is the general population in the maintenance of cyber security? 
5) What do you think the biggest risk to Estonian cyber security is? 
6) Is Estonia unique in the way that it handles cyber security? 
 
Sub-questions are only asked if they follow a logical path. Likewise, questions are tailored to 
individual interviewees expertise, and whether expertise is rooted in technical, legal or policy 
experience.  
 
The overall purpose of questions is to gage the understanding of cyber security of the 
interviewees in what is essential a binary test: do policy makers understand cyber security as 
being primarily concerned with the future, or the past? Data collected is analyzed using discourse 
analysis. If a interviewees answers focus on proactive policies that must be prepared for 
unprecedented risk that do not stem from perceived threats, but rather form the nature of 
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cyberspace itself, this signals a presence of the future which is a defining feature of a risk 
society. This is mostly addressed through questions 2 and 5. Carefully attention has been paid to 
the description of the risks and actors involved in cyber security, along with the most important 
features of strategy and policy. 
 
Another goal of the questions is to get a firm grasp on the interviewees understanding of the 
borderless nature of cyber security, or the blurring of traditional boundaries which is seen in risk 
society. Questions 3 and 4 and mainly geared towards this, and question 5 to a lesser degree. I 
focus specifically on the involvement of other sectors, besides government, in order to detail the 
importance of cooperation and horizontal collaboration in regards to drafting and implementing 
cyber security strategy. I also placed an emphasis on the understand of risk and perceptions of 
threat in order to showcase the proactive nature of strategy and the presence of the future. 
 
It is important to note the ways in which I have avoided bias and influencing the data collected in 
interviews. First and foremost I avoided using words which might influence or steer interviewees 
answers unnaturally; mostly words which I considered ‘buzzwords’ in my research. These are 
terms which have been discussed mostly in chapter one of the dissertation, and I therefore 
avoided my own understand of cyber security steering data. The avoided words were 
‘borderless’, ‘risk management’, ‘reflexive’, and ‘resilience’. Instead, I waited for interviewees 
to use these terms themselves and then asked them to elaborate. I also avoided using terms found 
in Beck’s risk society theory, such as ‘risk society’ and ‘presence of the future’, and overall 
avoided any theoretical questions. These measures were taken in order to ensure the integrity of 
my data and get a grasp on interviewees own experiences and views.   
 
3.2 Research Findings & Analysis 
 
This section will present the findings of my research and analyze them. This will include a 
analysis of discourse concerning the nature of the cyber domain and the management of risk in 
Estonian cyber security strategy. This analysis will mirror my the argument I have presented in 
this paper already, supporting the argument that viewing the understanding and treatment of the 
cyber by policy-makers is best analyzed through a risk society framework. I will present direct 
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quotes from my interviewees and discuss these statements and how they exemplify a departure 
form traditional understanding of security.  
 
Classifying Estonia as a Cyber Society 
 
I have argued that Estonia is a ideal case study for studying cyber security due to its high level of 
digitalization and focus on the cyber domain. I have introduced the concept of cyber society, a 
society which is dependent on ICT, and presented Estonia as an example of cyber society. 
Estonian society is extremely dependent on digital services, relying on ICT for everything from 
taxes to banking to government records. This dependence is realized by cyber security experts as 
well; all interviewees stressed how important ICT is for Estonian society. Dr. Rain Ottis, from 
Tallinn Technical University, stressed this early on in his discussing of Estonian cyber security: 
 
“Estonia is still very dependent [on ICT] and cyber security is still very 
important…Cyber security in Estonia is not a nice to have thing, it is a must have thing 
and therefore we should put emphasis and effort there.”  
 
Here Dr. Ottis states that cyber security is an essential part of the functioning of Estonian society, 
not merely something that is ‘nice to have’. This puts the importance of cyber security for 
Estonia into perspective. Other experts also talked about Estonian dependency on ICT: 
 
“The dependency on IT grows and it grows fast.”  
- Taimar Peterkop, RIA 
 
“We are very dependent on the e-services, and there is no going back to paper.” 
- Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
Clearly there is an awareness of the extent of dependence on ICT and the significance this puts 
on cyber security. The fact that Estonia is a cyber society is significant, as is the awareness of 
this fact by policy makers, which will be discussed later in this chapter. This further stresses my 
point that Estonia is a crucial case study because of its dependence on ICT. Throughout my 
interviews, it was extremely clear that Estonia is a cyber society and is dependent on e-services. 
This is supported by the nature of the Estonia ID-card system, which requires all citizens to have 
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the electronic card with which all government services, and the overwhelming majority of 
private services, reply upon. Nearly all government business is handled through e-services, and 
99.6% of all banking in Estonia is done through the web (e-stonia facts). Dr. Ottis’ statement 
reiterates the point I have made earlier in this paper: with increasing dependence on ICT comes 
an increasing importance of cyber security.   
 
Borderless Nature of the Cyber Domain 
 
I argue in chapter 1 that one of the most defining features of the cyber domain is its borderless 
nature. In risk society this is described as the blurring of traditional boundaries that is inherent in 
new modernity. This section discusses the qualification of the cyber domain as borderless by 
policy-makers and stakeholders in Estonian cyber security, focusing on their description of the 
nature and conception of what sets the cyber domain and cyber security apart.   
 
One of the most important parts of determining how experts understand cyber security as a 
whole, what defines it, and how it is different. When answering this question, experts almost 
always started off their discussion by stating the borderless nature of the cyber domain or cyber 
security. Some directly compared this to the nature of conventional security, stressing that this 
was a quality that was extremely important and determined how policy makers handle cyber 
security. Pilleriin Lillemets, a researcher at the Baltic Defence College (BDC), said: 
 
“One defining part of cyber security is the borderless nature of it; it makes it more 
complicated. You cant only have your very national policy or strategy because you are 
very much connect with every part of the world.”  
 
An expert at the Ministry of Economy and Communication, which is the ministry in charge of 
drafting Estonia’s national cyber security strategy, began discussion by saying:  
 
“The thing is that cyber security doesn’t have any borders; …when you talk about cyber 
security, it is international, cross border and effects every person. In short I think cyber is 
quite wide, you cannot put it in certain boundaries, its impossible.”  
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Mr. Siim Alatalu, of the CCDCOE, also spoke about the difference of the cyber domain 
compared to others, specifically stating that the fact that it was man-made set it apart. So cyber 
security is set apart by its borderless nature, which is something that must be considered when 
talking about it. For several of the interviewees, this was the first thing that was explicitly 
mentioned when asked to described cyber security and how it is different. From the above 
statements alone we can see a clear understanding of the borderless nature of the cyber domain, 
and we will see how it effect the nature of cyber security strategy.  Not only did experts simply 
qualify it as borderless, but many went on to describe the specific qualities which lack 
boundaries that had been also described in chapters 1 and 2. The following subsections take a 
closer look into what specific aspects of cyber security were lacking in borders.  
 
Lack of Defined Threat  
 
It is impossible to make a inclusive list of all of the risks and threats to the cyber domain. 
Estonian policy makers are aware of this and highlight the fact that much of the risk and threat 
are unknown and impossible to track, and that it is futile to attempt to focus on specific threats. 
This is something that guides strategy and policy.  
 
The interviewee at the Cyber Defence College elaborated on the idea of threat, focusing on the 
unknown features of it: 
 
“I think what makes it different the unknown part of it.” 
 
Taimar Peterkop, the head of the RIA, specifically contrasted the nature of threat in cyber 
security to that of traditional military security: 
 
“If you look at military security, for centuries the threat has been to the east and they’ve 
used the same routes, so its always the same approach […] so you know what to do. But 
in cyber it changes, but every year you have a completely new threat.” 
 
Mr. Peterkop also detailed the specific routes that had been utilized in military attacks against 
Estonia for centuries. This highlights a very important point: in military security for Estonia, 
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threats are tied to physical borders and therefore easy to understand and know, and they are often 
constant. The tools may change but the routes do not. But because cyberspace is constantly 
expanding and innovating, the tools and the routes change. This makes it very difficult to zero in 
on specific threats and make precise strategies on past knowledge, as it is with conventional 
security. When discussing the process of scenario-based strategies, Mr. Peterkop elaborated on 
the necessity to focus on system failures rather than try to narrow down to most likely scenarios: 
 
“We are looking at scenarios based on the systems which are the core of our digital 
society, we are not looking at the threat vectors, because are too many of them.”  
 
So policy makers do not focus on specific scenarios, but rather focus on making a detailed plan 
on how to protect critical infrastructure due to the difficulty of pinpointing such specific 
scenarios. There are simply too many risks to consider to be able to focus on specific types of 
threats. Further more, there is also an issue with understand what is an attack, as Ms. Lillimets 
explained:  
  
“We are constantly under attack, but also what is an attack? Our networks are always 
attacked or penetrated or tested for vulnerabilities.” 
 
There is acknowledgment of the continual risk to the cyber domain, and this results in the focus 
leaning away from specific threats or specific attacks. Instead, there is a mentality of needing to 
be ready for anything which is created by this uncertainty:  
 
“We’re not pointing finger and saying you are likely to attack us, we’re saying here are 
the kinds of things we are worried about and here are the things we can do in order make 
our system more resilient to various types of problems”  
– Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ  
 
“You need to have a holistic approach because you really don’t know what kind of 
attacker you are facing and you need to have collaboration.”  
– Dr. Robert Krimmer, TTÜ 
 
“And it is harder to know if there is going to be an attack on your systems, but making 
sure everyone knows their basic cyber security isn’t.” 
- Pilleriin Lillemets, BDC 
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Based off of these statements, we can observe several thing. Firstly, that the Estonian cyber 
domain is constantly plagued by threats which are difficult to discern. Secondly, Estonian policy-
makers and stakeholders are aware of this blurriness and have reacted to it by focusing on a more 
comprehensive approach to cyber security. This lack of focus on specific threats is something 
that is not seen often, particularly when dealing with security. However, if you view this from a 
risk society point of view, this is understandable and we can see that policy-makers must view 
cyber risks in this manner given the nature of the domain.  
 
 
Lack of Defined Actors 
 
A contributing factor to the lack of defined threat is the lack of defined actors. There are two 
levels to this: lack of defined risk actors and lack of defined security providers. This is another 
feature of the borderless nature of the cyber domain detailed in chapter 1 and 2. The cyber 
domain lacks the traditional boundaries in terms of sector that conventional security domains do. 
This has significant consequences on cyber security, mainly that a more comprehensive approach 
must be taken. The lack of defined actors operating in cyber security means that everyone is both 
a risk and a security provider.  
 
Everyone is a Risk 
 
In cyber security everyone who uses a connected device is a potential threat to security and 
therefore a risk. If Estonia is a cyber society, which is supported by policy makers statements, 
then everyone in a society is digitally connected and therefore everyone is a risk. We can add this 
to the already long list of risk actors explained in previous chapter: states, foreign individuals, 
and groups of individuals such as terrorist groups of ‘hacktavist’ groups. The head of the Cyber 
Security branch at RIA had this to say about risk actors in cyber: 
 
“This is a big difference between cyber security and physical security: each and every 
user is a possible risk, each and every entity can effect cyber security in general.” 
- Uku Särekanno, RIA 
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On a similar note, Ms. Lillemets stated:  
 
“The biggest problem is people, the human error and the person sitting behind the desk is 
the biggest cyber risk.” 
 
The main reason that everyone behind a desk is a risk is due to both the simple risk of an 
individual not knowing how to properly protect themselves in cyberspace. While not everyone 
will be careless, there has to be an understanding of the potential of risk.  
 
Beyond this acknowledgment of basic human error as a potential risk, interviewees also touched 
upon the point that individuals have a heightened ability to act as threat actor as a ‘lone hacker’, 
or an individual acting alone in their cybercrime. There are also groups of individuals, which 
interviewees often referred to as ‘hacktavists’, both in a non-state capacity and in a state-
sanctioned capacity. Finally, there are state actors in this matrix. This was the most common 
classification of potential threat actors, though there was discussion of how these three ‘levels’ 
interact and mesh. The overarching theme was that there we a great deal of potential threat actors 
to Estonian national cyber security, so much so that it was not fruitful to try and identify them 
and strategize specific responses to them.  
 
Security Providers 
 
Cyber security is also different from traditional security in terms of where security comes from 
and who provides security. This is another facet of the lack of boundaries in cyber security. In 
conventional security the state is the provider of security and the main actor within security. 
However, due to the nature of the cyber domain this approach is not feasible, and viewing the 
state as the main provider of security ignores the importance of the involvement and agency of 
other actors in security. This is clearly the case with regard to Estonian national cyber security, 
and was evident through interviews. The securing of Estonian cyberspace is achieved through the 
public sector, the private sector and through civilians. Interviewees focused on the importance of 
a bottom-up approach to cyber security, stressing the role of the private sector and the general 
public. Piret Pernik, a researcher at the ICDS, elaborated on this: 
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“Because of the fact that everyone owns a device [there is a] personal responsibility that 
everyone has to take care of there own personal cyber security. This isn’t the case in 
traditional military security where the state provides security; in this sense the 
responsibility is spread.” 
 
This shows that individuals in a society are responsible for cyber security as well, not just the 
government. Mr. Peterkop also stressed the importance of a holistic approach when considering 
how to secure national cyberspace:  
 
“I think the main different between cyber security and conventional national security so 
far is that approach to cyber security has to be distributed, its not a top down approach 
like you have in military security.” 
 
One of the ways that citizen are involved in the securing of cyberspace is through participation in 
the Cyber Unit of the Estonian Defense League, a voluntary organization which helps monitor 
cyberspace: 
 
“People are involved through the Cyber Defense League4, there’s a network of IT 
administrators who monitor the internet and give feedback, and that happens also on 
local level…there is a lot of communication there.”  
– Dr. Robert Krimmer 
 
 
The Cyber Unit was mentioned often by interviewees. The emphasis on this voluntary force, 
sometimes referred to a ‘cyber militia’, and its existence in the first place, shows the level to 
which cyber security practices in Estonia are spread out and shared by society. The concept of a 
‘militia’ is not something that has been considered integral or even useful in recent times, yet the 
Estonian model for the Cyber Unit is been studied and considered as a model for other nations as 
well. This shows that the involvement of civilians in cyber security is indeed different to that of 
traditional security. 
 
This is also extended towards the private sector, which plays a significant role in the 
maintenance of cyber security. A large majority of critical infrastructure, such as banking, is 
                                                
4 The ‘Cyber Defense League’ is the former name of the Cyber Unit of the Estonian Defense League, interviewees 
sometimes referred to it as the ‘CDL’. 
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actually maintained and developed by the private sector, a fact that interviewees stressed as an 
important part of the necessity to consider all parts of society as upholders of security. This 
means that the private sector is also a integral part of securing cyberspace and has a huge amount 
of responsibility in terms of cyber security and the functioning of Estonian e-society. Mr. 
Särekanno stressed this need: 
 
“A number of risks are associated with the essential service providers in the private 
sector and its up to them to make sure they have the capabilities and ability to handle 
them. So it requires a lot of cooperation and mutual effort to build up a solid baseline 
security.” 
 
Mr. Särekanno touches upon an important point: that the need for multi-sector approach in cyber 
security in turn creates a need for cooperation and communication. The strategy address this and 
drafts policies which regulate the security measures taken by the private sector: 
 
“There is a good cooperation because they [the private sector] need to follow security 
standards. Also in law, the private sector has to implement those security measures.” 
- Piret Pernik, ICDS 
 
The private sector’s role in the securing of Estonian cyberspace is an essential part of cyber 
security, and the strategy and policy reflect this in their treatment of it. Strategy and policy not 
only regulate the security practices of the private sector, but also place an emphasis on 
partnership and working together: 
 
“We put a lot of emphasis in building this community and a public-private partnership” 
- Taimar Peterkop, RIA 
 
“It is extremely important that the agency [RIA] is viewed not only as a supervisor but as 
a partner in cyber security.”  
- Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
“[There must be] cooperation between government, private sector, and academy in order 
to integrate cyber into lives of everyday citizens…cyber security should be a part of our 
every day lives, I think this is the biggest change in Estonian society.”  
- Madis Raaper, MEAC 
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Furthermore, Mr. Peterkop also discussed the involvement of the private sector in terms of filling 
in the gaps where the government is lacking:  
 
“The government usually isn’t very good at procuring e-solutions. The private sector 
delivered more than expected. Last autumn we had ID-card crisis, we need a specific 
competency which we lacked, we turned to a specific company and they gave us the 
technology we needed.”  
– Mr. Taimar Peterkop, RIA 
 
Other interviewees also discussed this, stating that the majority of innovation comes from the 
private sector, and there is a high level of cooperation between state and private sectors in order 
to maintain a functional system. Beyond this, every interviewee talked at length about the 
involvement of the private sector and ‘relevant stakeholders’ and experts from various 
institutions in the strategy drafting process itself: 
 
“So currently we have four or five different  workshops with different stakeholders, and I 
would say that most of the key players form the community have been engaged.”  
– Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
“We invite all research institutions, academies, universities, private sector, ministries, so 
in this sense I don’t think this is very common for normal procedures.” 
- Piret Perdik, ICDS 
 
“Everybody is [involved]. We include all relevant stakeholders from public and private 
sector, academia and non-profit as well.”   
– Raul Rikk, EGA 
 
One of the strongest themes from the interviews was the stress on the involvement of all 
stakeholders in the policy-making process, and the important of considering everyone in terms of 
practicing security. Thus we cannot explicitly label actors in Estonian cyber security regarding 
who practices security, or who provides security. These sentiments expressed by interviewees 
were also seen expressed in the second national cyber security strategy of Estonia. Principle 4 
states that:  
 
“Cyber security is ensured in a coordinated manner through cooperation between the 
public-, private- and third sectors, taking into account the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of existing infrastructure and services in cyberspace.” 
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– Estonian National Cyber Security Strategy, Principle 4 
 
The entire society is responsible for the maintenance and security of cyberspace, and this is an 
attitude that held by Estonian policy-makers and stakeholders.  
 
Bug Bounties and Penetration Testing 
 
A specific example of the significance of cooperation that interviewees spoke about was the 
importance of penetration testing. This is along similar lines to the cyber hygiene test in 
development. Instead, this service is offered by the Estonian government, RIA in particular, to 
private companies in order to test the resilience and strength of their firewalls:  
 
“We have contracts where we do penetration testing and we do it with government 
funding. And the companies get very useful information regarding weaknesses in the 
system, but for the government the benefit is that they essentially are doing the necessary 
adjustments that are needed.”  
– Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
 
Another example of this is the reserve: bug bounties. Dr. Rain Ottis described these bug bounties 
and why they are unique and important: 
 
“Most cyber incidents happen because of errors in programming, so companies offer 
rewards for anyone who can find a bug and report it… This is different from a more 
state-centric view, where the state has full power and everyone must work for you.”  
 
 
As Dr. Ottis stressed, this concept is a very different take on conventional view of security, 
where the state take full responsibility. Both the public and private sector take advantage of the 
borderless nature of the cyber domain, specifically the fact that every individual takes an active 
part in it. This is another way that Estonian strategy manages risk within the cyber domain.  
 
 
Cyber Opportunity in Estonia 
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With increased dependence on digital services and ICT, Estonia’s need for strong cyber security 
increases as well. This is one of the defining traits of the cyber domain and of a risk society. I 
have argued that as cyber security is best understood through a lens of risk society theory, 
increased digitalization brings more risk to the cyberspace of Estonia. As Estonia is a cyber 
society that keeps digitalizing and relying on these services, it is also exposing itself to more risk. 
While it is enormously beneficial for Estonia to continue this process, it also creates risk and 
makes the country vulnerable. It makes it vulnerable to attacks, but also to the systemic risks 
which characterize and define a risk society. These systemic risks are borne out of digitalization 
and created by the system, i.e. cyberspace, itself. These risks are malfunctions and malware 
which come from the programming or failure of systems, and are not enacted by individual, 
groups, or states. In a risk society, people are aware of these systemic risks and the reflexive 
nature of modernization.  
 
Estonian cyber security policy makers and stakeholders are aware the systemic risk which 
characterize their cyber society, and the reflexive nature. Interviewees often specifically 
addressed the reflexive nature of digitalization:  
 
“We are very dependent on these things, and vulnerabilities is a nature part the bigger 
the system is the more vulnerabilities there are. When we are completely reliant on these 
service it can backfire at some point.”  
- Pilleriin Lillemets, BDC 
 
“Because we are so dependent on cyberspace so we are more vulnerable than other 
countries.”  
- Piret Pernik, ICDS 
 
“Firstly, we are very dependent on the e-governmental services, which makes us very 
vulnerable and we have to pay much more attention to cyber security than other 
countries.”  
- Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
“Now that there is a higher level of e-voting, that makes us more attractive to state level 
attack, and we need to monitor, and RIA is doing a lot”  
– Dr. Robert Krimmer, TTÜ 
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This shows that cyber security experts are indeed aware of the reflexive opportunity that comes 
along with advancement of ICT. Interviewees stated that cyber security was more important in 
Estonia because it was advanced and reliant on these systems. Estonia’s modernization and 
innovation of ICT, e-services, and e-governance also exposed it to risk it was no before. The 
interviewees were aware of this face and the necessary marriage between modernization in 
cyberspace and vulnerability in cyberspace.  
 
There was also a significant amount of discussion concerning the reflexive risks which stem 
from the system itself. The risks themselves are lacking the traditional ‘from whom’ actors, and 
instead are systemic. Interviewees discussed these risks at lengths, stating that these systemic 
risks are the most common:    
 
“Most cyber incidents happen because of errors in programming.” 
- Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ 
 
“If you look at stats about the incidents are reported to CERT, most are related to 
malware.” 
- Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
Most of the risk to Estonian cyberspace is not cybercrime or cyber attacks, as some might expect, 
but everyday malfunctions, or systemic risks. And Estonian policy-makers pay keen attention to 
this, and are aware of this fact. In addition to awareness of the nature of these risks as systemic, 
there is also a acknowledgement that these risks are the biggest threat to cyber security. 
 
“I think that the more the discussion goes on the more it becomes about the everyday 
than the big catastrophic incident.”  
- Pilleriin Lillemets, CDC 
 
This statements shows that experts consider everyday cyber security, such as systemic risks, as 
the biggest threat to cyber security in Estonia. This was a common theme discussed by 
interviewees. While they acknowledged the importance of planning both for cyber attacks, small 
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and large, and everyday systemic risks, there is an agreement that these systemic risks ought to 
be the focus because they are the most common. This sets cyber security apart from conventional 
security because large scale attacks are not considered the main risk to be dealt with. This 
understanding has developed as cyber security is discussed more and more, because society 
become increasingly aware of these systemic risks and adapts accordingly.  
 
“It ended up in a way that the strategy focuses on the capabilities we need to develop in 
order to cope with the modern world.” 
– Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
 
 
The Nature of Estonian Cyber Security Strategy and Policy 
 
All of these characteristics of the cyber domain and the concept of risk culminate in a proactive 
approach to cyber security strategy and policy. Through Beck’s risk society lens, we can 
rephrase this by stating that policies possess a presence of the future. Strategy and policy cannot 
be reactive in nature, especially as the culture of cyber security evolves, because of the 
borderless nature of threats and actors. It must focus on preventative measures due to the 
unknown factors that plagues the reflexive nature of the cyber domain. This is why there is a 
significant presence of the future in strategy and policy, and why they focus on resilience and 
agility. Estonian policy-makers do understand the cyber domain in a specific manner which can 
be understood through risk society, particularly because they are aware of the reflexive nature of 
it. Because of this, Estonian cyber security strategy expresses this understanding through 
proactive policies with a significant presence of the future.  Taimar Peterkop characterized 
Estonian cyber security strategy as such: 
 
“You have to be very agile and flexible and proactive in cyber security… We cannot 
prepare for every scenario, in conventional, you have specific scenarios, in cyber you 
have to be much more abstract.”  
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The notion that strategy and policy must look towards the future was very clear from the 
interviews. This is mostly shown the focus on the concept of resilience, which came off as 
extremely important. All interviewees stressed the concept of resilience, and agility, as the most 
important part of cyber security:  
 
“The cyber strategy is about resilience. It has different components, but we are mostly 
concerned with building resilience”  
- Taimar Peterkop, RIA 
 
“It is more about cyber resilience, specific threats are considered as well but the strategy 
is more based on building capabilities.”  
- Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
“We’re saying here are the kinds of things we are worried about and here are the things 
we can do in order make our system more resilient to various types of problems.”  
- Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ 
 
These three statements exemplify the rationale behind resilience in cyber security. It is difficult, 
if not impossible, to make a cyber security strategy or policy which focused on specific threats. 
Discussion of resilience often went hand in hand with discussion about the nature of risk to cyber 
security. This shows that that policy makers are more concerned with planning and risk 
management than having a strategy that is specified towards threats. This shows that policy-
makers are aware of the nature of the risk they are dealing with as uncertain, reflexive, and never 
ending. There is a big emphasis placed on the idea of alternate solutions as well in regards to 
cyber resilience. Dr. Robert Krimmer described the resilience of the Estonian e-voting system: 
 
“The whole election system is designed so that if the system is malfunctioning, you can 
still cast a vote because its an advanced voting system”  
– Dr. Robert Krimmer  
 
Interviewees stated that this is the way the Estonian infrastructure and e-services have been 
designed, so that if there is a failure, there will not be a failure of access to services or 
information. Building alternative solutions into the system builds a resilient system that ensures 
the functioning of the e-state even when something goes wrong, which Estonian policy-makers 
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and stakeholder always assume will. Subgoal 1.1 of the Estonian cyber security strategy centers 
around the importance of building alternative solutions.  
 
Additionally, there was more emphasis on the importance of the role of cooperation in cyber 
resilience, against stressing the borderless-ness of the cyber domain and how it translates to 
strategy and policy: 
 
“Is mostly about government, how to achieve resilience though education, cooperation 
between different sectors, through academy, through raising competence and I think also 
we need functioning e-state.”  
- Madis Raaper, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MEAC) 
 
“Everyone understands that there is no such thing as 100% secure device, so sooner or 
later you will be hacked, so its how quickly can operate normal [functions]. You can see 
this thinking in previous strategy, it was about designing resilience.”  
- Piret Pernik, ICDS 
 
 
Therefore building a resilient Estonian cyberspace must also consider all the relevant 
stakeholders. As the cyber domain spreads across all sectors of society, there must also be a 
focus on making sure that the concept of resilience is present across all of the cyber domain. The 
importance of involving ‘all relevant stakeholders’ was a reoccurring theme that stuck out in all 
interviews. This is something that is different from conventional understanding on security; we 
would not see the same thing happening in the drafting of the Estonian National Security 
Strategy.  
 
The specific concept of risk management was also a key theme along with resilience and 
preparedness. The emphasis on the risk management as being the center for cyber security 
highlights the fact that cyber security is an ongoing process: 
 
“The basic concern for us is preparedness and risk management. That’s the basic 
concern. We really want the private and also public sector to assess their risks and do the 
proper adjustments in line with assessments.”  
– Uku Sarekanno, RIA 
 
 56 
“[This is] why alternative are important and the system needs to be resilient enough to 
withstand attacks if they might have. This is what we are aiming for, not to say no to 
technology but to manage the risks.”  
– Taimar Peterkop, RIA  
 
This statement in particular specifically indicates the awareness of the risks that come from 
modernization. Policy-makers and stakeholders are aware that innovation breeds more risk, but 
rather than curtail modernization of the cyber, they chose to move forward in a way which 
manages these risks that are produced. This is what cyber security is to Estonia, the management 
of the risks which are produced by the cyber domain. The idea of managing also implies the 
continuity of risk in the cyber domain. Cyber security must be the management of risks because 
there will always be risks: 
 
“It is something that has been planned for and you engage the relevant parties from 
private and public sector, and you through it and survive because there is no way, 
absolutely no way, of building a 100% secure system. If you have to plan for partial 
failure and this is normal.”  
– Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ 
 
“When it comes to do with what to do in order to protect their computers, and personal 
data, they might understand the threat, but there is a continuous need to improve the skill 
on what to do exactly.” 
         – Mr. Raul Rikk, EGA  
 
Estonian cyber security strategy is much more focused on building a resilient and agile system 
over all then focusing on specific threats. This is because of the nature of the cyber domain as 
one which is borderless and reflexive. Estonian policy-makers understand that strategy must 
focus on managing the risks due to the reflexive nature of these risks, i.e. system risks, and the 
fact that continued innovation will also continue to produce more risks. Estonia has taken the 
stance that cyber strategy must be prepared for the unknown risks and threats they will face in 
the future, rather than one which safeguards against the threats they have faced in the past.  
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ID-Card Crisis 
 
One example of the nature of the Estonian system which displays these attributes is the ID-card 
crisis of 2017. The National ID-card of Estonia, which is mandatory for all citizens, is the 
foundation of the e-service system. Voting, banking, and government services revolve around the 
ID-card, which is based off a electronic chip. In 2017, the security of the system was called into 
question when a vulnerability was found it the software, potentially exposing citizens to identity 
theft. This was a topic which came up frequently in interviews, and, surprisingly, was treated as a 
positive thing: 
 
“We needed an id crisis like this, because it showed that our government is able to react 
quickly and effectively. It also automatically enhances the level of trust in e-society and 
in government. Trust in governments fluctuates, trust is e society doesn’t fade away.”  
– Madis Raaper, MEAC 
 
This positive spin on the crisis is founded in the idea that this vulnerability was brought to the 
attention of the government before it was a major issue. And indeed, it was fixed before any 
citizen’s information was exposed or stolen. This was also expressed by Mr. Alatalu of the 
CCDCOE: 
 
“It was a good thing to be exposed to it before any damage was done.”  
 
Likewise, Dr. Ottis spoke about the incident as being a successful demonstration of the agility of 
the Estonian system, and the important of alternative solutions in a situation such as this:  
 
“Last year we had a problem with the ID card, one way to solve this would have been to 
say: ‘ok we have problems with the ID-card so we’ll temporarily move to Mobiil-ID.’” 
 
 
The attitude that experts took towards the crisis shows the underlying attitude towards cyber 
security as a whole in Estonia. It is better to be prepared for anything, so that the system will be 
able to adapt quickly in order to fix an unexpected issue. This was the case with the ID-card 
crisis. A system which expects failure is able to handle it better than a system which does not. 
The ID-card crisis is an important example for another reason, in that the solution was presented 
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to the Estonian government by a private company. Interviewees explained that an IT company 
approached the RIA on its own in order to suggest a possible solution to the vulnerability. This 
shows the importance of the cooperation between the public and private sector when it comes to 
cyber security.  
 
 
Role of Education and Cyber Awareness 
 
There are many methods of building up cyber resilience, however one method which sticks out 
as both very important and indicative of the borderless nature of cyber security: the role of 
education and cyber awareness. The stress that is put on the importance of cyber awareness of 
the entire society reiterates the fact that cyber security must involved all sectors. I have already 
discussed the importance that cyber experts placed on the role of individuals in securing 
cyberspace, now I discuss the way it is dealt with in strategy and policy.  
 
One of the key terms here is cyber hygiene, which refers to basic digital security for the 
individual. Dr. Rain Ottis describes it as such: 
 
“Cyber hygiene is cyber equivalent of brushing your teeth; it should be possible for 
everyone. Anyone who is able to pick up an iPad, and do something there should also be 
able to get a bit more aware of cyber threats and basic security best practice.”  
- Dr. Rain Ottis, TTÜ 
 
So here we see that there is a clear idea that anyone and everyone should be able to practice basic 
cyber security practices, and that this is something that can be expected in a cyber society such as 
Estonia. To implement this, policy makers stress the importance of starting at the base of society 
again, and focusing on a bottom-up approach: 
 
“I think we should start from grassroots level, and we should go to school system. I think 
step one is, and I am not saying this will be included in new strategy but it will pan out 
eventually, I think there will be certain cyber hygiene course for elementary school kids” 
- Madis Raaper, MEAC 
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“With the campaigns and cyber hygiene testing and basic teachings in school that’s the 
way we try to handle it.”   
- Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
 
So there is a importance placed on implementing these awareness measures at the starting point 
of society, schools. This is built off of the recognition that individuals pose a risk to cyber 
security discussed earlier. As individuals are both risks and also directly involved and connected 
to the cyber domain, they must be considered in strategy. Interviewees stated that schools was a 
focus of this, and that this focus would continue to grow in the future strategies. However this 
extends outside of schools as well:  
 
“I think that the…we could increase our own cyber security and decrease the 
vulnerabilities when we educate everyone from my grandma to my prime 
minister…because it is sometimes the easier things you can do for your own cyber 
hygiene that can prevent bigger things from happening.”  
- Pilleriin Lillements, BDC 
 
In regards to the military education course at the Baltic Defence College, Pilleriin Lillemets 
discussed the process of training all student in very basic cyber security practices, and also the 
role of the cyber hygiene test: 
 
“All the students who come in have to take the cyber hygiene test, and this is where it 
starts.”  
 
Similarly, Mr. Särekanno discussed the development of program designed to help individuals 
assess their security practices:  
 
“Speaking about cyber hygiene, we are putting more and more effort into this. We are 
currently testing and piloting a system which people can test their own cyber security 
skills and assess your cyber habits.”  
– Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
Again this shows the importance of every individual in Estonian society to be at the very least 
educated and informed on basic cyber security. The emphasis on cyber hygiene and education is 
one way in which Estonian cyber security strategy manages risk. There was an understanding 
amongst interviewees that cyber hygiene and basic awareness of the population concerning cyber 
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security practice could prevent future incidents from happening and disrupting the functioning of 
Estonian cyber society. Once again, we can see that this was translated into the second strategy. 
Principle 5 states that “cyber security starts with individual responsibility for safe use of ICT 
tools”. The role of raising awareness is a constant theme through the strategy, and is specifically 
addressed in several of the subgoals (Estonian NCSS). In this way we can see that Estonian 
policy-makers and stakeholders focus on managing the risks posed to the cyber domain by the 
involvement of individuals, and explicitly stated that this could prevent future incidents.  
 
The Attribution Issue  
 
The act of attributing attacks is another issue that was discussed by interviewees. There were 
several component to this issue. One issue was simply that it was difficult to attribute attacks, 
given the nature of the cyber domain. It was stressed that not only was it difficult, but that 
Estonia rarely had the resources to spare in what it a lengthy and expensive process. This was 
especially due to lack of manpower. Dr. Rain Ottis stressed this heavily:  
 
“But in most cases today if you have a serious opponent you are going to have trouble 
identifying you are under attack, let alone attributing.”  
 
“Coming back to strategy, especially smaller countries like Estonia, to some degree 
strategy must be agnostic in terms of who is attacking us. We very rarely have resources 
to attribute attack. Even if we do attribute to state actor, realistic what can we do? We 
can only talk about it in international forums.”  
 
 
This particularly was stressed by technical and defense experts, who discussed the more practical 
issues of attribution. Ms. Lillemets also elaborated that there were political concerning in 
attributing, even if you are able to successfully attribute:  
 
“In the 2007 attack, some politicians said it was Russia but officially did not attribute to 
Russia. When you do this you can trace it, and then consider whether you want to name 
the person, because when you do you reveal the extent of your capabilities.” 
 
 
She went on to state that when a state does reveal the extent of their abilities, they face the 
possibility of opening themselves up to further targeting. This is another aspect of the reflexive 
opportunity that is presence in the cyber domain and influences the handling of cyber security. 
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There was an understanding that because Estonia is a cyber society, this attracts negative 
attention in the form of cyber attacks and cyber crime, whether state sanctioned or not.  
 
Another aspect to the attribution problem that was very clear was the apparent lack of necessity 
for it. When this topic came up and interviewees were asked to elaborate, they did not imply that 
attribution was a main concern when it came to Estonian cyber security: 
 
“You don’t need to know exactly who is behind the threat, because the threat can come 
from around the world, you can’t possibly identify all the threat sources or threat 
vectors…what you can do is protect your systems so that whoever is behind the attack or 
whatever might happen, if you keep in mind these aspects you are more or less are safe.” 
  – Raul Rikk, EGA 
 
The sentiment shown by Mr. Rikk’s statement exemplifies the understanding that the knowledge 
of who is attacking you from where does not help in the actual protecting of systems. This is 
because the Estonian mindset when it comes to cyber security is that you must assume someone 
is always trying to attack you, so you must instead be ready at all times. Ms. Lillemets also 
showed this sentiment: 
 
“It is harder to know if there is going to be an attack on your systems, but making sure 
everyone knows their basic cyber security isn’t.” 
 
 
Estonian experts were less concerned with the who and why than with the issue of resilience and 
preparedness. This is clearly shown in their emphasis on resilience and building an agile system 
that can withstand a multitude of attacks and problems. This is a response to the nature of the 
cyber domain, and the lack of clear threat that is presence. Estonian policy-makers had to focus 
on building a system which was resilient to withstand a number of attack, and in essence be 
ready for whatever the future might bring, because there was an inability to know what attacks 
were coming.  
 
 
Evolution of Policies 
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Interviewees also made a point to discuss the evolution of the national cyber security strategy of 
Estonia, saying that strategy has gone from one which was a reaction to the 2007 attack to one 
which is more forward looking:  
 
“In our case it all started in 2007, from point of view of strategy planning it was quite a 
security matter for us, the cyber attacks…The first one addressed security framework, the 
next one was focused on upgrade, and enhanced early warning, resilience, awareness, 
and now were are preparing third one.”  
– Uku Särekanno, RIA 
 
 
“I think our first strategy was more reactive, but now the new one is more proactive, we 
are looking at possibilities if we cannot do it. And what will happen if we fail to meet 
these goals, basically we are forward looking.”  
– Madis Raaper , MEAC 
 
 
Here we see a progression in the cyber security strategies from being reactive to being proactive. 
Estonian experts and policy-makers initially acted due to the 2007 attacks, but as the cyber 
security of Estonian began to be taken more seriously, there was a deeper understanding of the 
nature of the cyber domain that flourished. The understanding of the cyber domain has pushed 
Estonian policy-makers to take cyber security strategy down a different road than conventional 
security strategies have take. This has been the case with the second strategy and this trend will 
continue with the third strategy, which has yet to be published:  
 
“The thing is we are drafting third strategy and what we did different is we included 
everyone who is someone in cyber, including private sector, IT companies, other 
government institutions, and university, absolutely, and we had seminar and they gave us 
their input and they gave us their feedback.”  
– Madis Raaper  
 
 
Mr. Alatalu described the first cyber security strategy as being very concerned with the aftermath 
of the 2007 attack, but then that the next strategy had been more focused on building skills and 
resilience in the system. The third strategy, he says, is even more forward looking, looking 
“beyond the horizon”, and focuses on issues such as artificial intelligence and data leaks, as well 
as focusing on broader question such as how society works through cyber. Estonian policy-
makers are striving to improve the already high level of security integration with the next 
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strategy. Not only are they involving more and more relevant parties, but they are also trying to 
consider more possible areas to consider in strategy, areas of development that will produce 
unknown risks.  
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Conclusions 
 
To conclude this paper, I will summarize my arguments and the outcomes of the empirical case 
study. I will give an overview of my characterization of the cyber domain along with the 
theoretical framework with which I explain the understand of cyber security. I will then give a 
final conclusion for the case of Estonian cyber security discourse, stating the overall findings of 
my research. 
 
I have argued that the understanding and functioning of security in the domain of cyberspace is 
fundamentally different to that of conventional military security. The cyber domain is 
differentiated from traditional domains of security by its borderless nature, the reflexive risk 
which dictates cyber opportunity, and the proactive nature of its strategies and policies. These 
characteristics cannot be adequately understood by conventional security theory, but can be 
explained by Beck’s theory on risk society. The borderless features of the cyber domain is 
characteristic of the blurring of traditional borders which is seen in a risk society. These 
disappearing borders include defined threats and defined actors, in terms of threat actors and 
security providers. This is also seen in the lack of physically boundaries in the cyber domain, and 
the difficulty of setting national borders. Lastly, cyberspace encompasses all sectors of society: 
public, private, and civilian.  
 
The cyber domain is also governed by the reflexive nature of its innovation and advances. The 
risks are self-generated, and the more a society continues to advance the more at risk it is. This is 
one of the defining features of the cyber domain. The main security risks are not from outside 
actor, but from the modern institutions which society has created. This reflexive nature and the 
importance of systemic risks is overlooked when considering the cyber domain from a traditional 
understanding of security, in which threats have very strictly defined actors and objects. 
However, by looking at the cyber domain from a risk society understanding, we can see that 
these systemic risks are characteristics of new modernity, which is reflexive due to our continued 
advancements. Without the creation of cyberspace and e-society, there would be no risk. 
However, it is the awareness of this reflexive nature which has changed the way the cyber 
security is understood and dealt with. This awareness has a profound effect on the direction of 
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cyber security strategy, making strategy proactive rather than reactive. This is because of the 
nature of the cyber domain, which prevents society from being about to predict what threats we 
might face. This is why cyber security strategy focuses on resilience and agility, so that it might 
be prepared for the onslaught of systemic risks and unknown threats that it faces every day. This 
focus on resilience and agility is an example of the presence of the future as explained by risk 
society theory. Due to the awareness of the nature of the cyber domain, policy-makers focus 
cyber security strategy on preparedness because of this ever-present risk.  
 
The understanding of the cyber domain by Estonian policy-makers and stakeholders is consistent 
with this analysis in several ways. Firstly, cyber security is seen as being borderless. Experts 
both stated that it is difficult to differentiate what is national cyber security because it quickly 
becomes global. Likewise, there is a difficulty of pinpointing specific threats. Cyber security 
stands apart from traditional security because policy makers and stake holders are unable to 
predict threats and plan accordingly. There is an understanding that there are too many risks in 
the cyber realm. Rather than focus on specific scenarios, cyber security must focus on planning 
for system failure and making secure that the critical infrastructure is resilient. We can see and 
understanding that this is the way policy-makers view risk and the cyber domain through 
adopting risk society theory as a means of analysis. Estonian cyber security strategy does not 
attempt to classify and identify all the threat vectors, nor does it monopolize the practicing of 
cyber security in Estonia, and we can understand why when we look at their actions and words 
through this specific theoretical lens.  
 
Estonian cyber security experts are aware of the reflexive nature of the risks in cyberspace. 
Policy makers do not view cyber security as a goal that can be achieved, it is an ongoing process 
of risk management rather than securing totally. This understanding is seen in the nature of 
Estonia cyber security policy and strategies, which focus on resilience and agility of Estonian 
cyberspace. These strategies are proactive in nature rather than reactive, and have a significant 
presence of the future in that they seek to be ready for unknown risks. This is evident in the large 
amount of importance that Estonian policy makers place on cyber awareness and education, and 
through their concept of cyber hygiene. This aids in the ongoing process of cyber resilience by 
attempting to manage the risks that are created by everyday users.  
 66 
 
The understanding of cyber security by Estonian policy makers and stake holders coincides with 
that of a risk society, and we can understand their departure from conventional approach and 
treatment of security to a more risk-based and resilience-based approach. Experts characterize 
the cyber domain as borderless, and differentiate cyber security from ‘conventional security’, and 
this has a significant impact on the nature of strategies and policies. Perhaps most importantly, 
Estonian experts are aware of the reflexive nature of cyber opportunity and the systemic risk 
which dictates the domain. This awareness is what makes a risk society a risk society, and what 
guides Estonian cyber security strategy and policy down a proactive path rather then a reactive 
path.  By looking at the cyber domain and the treatment of cyber security through this lens, we 
can understand why policy-makers and stakeholder conceptualized cyber risk and security in the 
way that they do.  
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